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What this report is about? 
Contemporary project business is characterized by networks of companies, 
subprojects and participating individuals. The orchestration of a project 
network towards its ultimate goal requires simultaneous negotiation with 
multiple parties. Without appropriate negotiation practices between project 
parties in place, even the finest engineering solutions or most innovative 
contracting methods for organizing project activities will remain abstract 
and ineffective in achieving the ultimate goals of the project. 
Yet, mastering negotiations with multiple partners first requires mastering 
the simpler case of negotiations between two major parties, which, in a 
project setting, translates into searching for win-win solutions between a 
project contractor and a project client. This report interprets the entire 
process of selling and delivering a project as a negotiation process. We 
suggest that negotiations between the contractor and the client occur 
throughout the lifecycle of a project delivery, with different emphasis in 
different phases.  
The simplistic and static to-the-plan or by-the-contract focus on managing 
project activities is suggested to be enhanced by a dynamic negotiation 
process. Such a negotiation-oriented approach shifts project management 
towards a more meaningful, continuous search of ever more appropriate 
business solutions for the client. In addition, the negotiation-oriented 
approach emphasizes a contractor’s continuous management of customer 
relationships, placing more focus on future business with additional project 
deliveries than on mere management of the work of an individual project. 
For the purpose of describing and analyzing negotiations in project sales 
and delivery, this report uses two important areas of established scientific 
knowledge: negotiation analysis and project marketing. Through these two 
areas, this report paves the way towards our understanding of negotiation 
in project networks, with chains of contractors’ delivery projects and 
clients’ procurement-contained projects, constituting altogether a whole 
network of companies and their projects. 
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Abstract 
 
Project sales and delivery processes entail complex negotiations between 
client and contractor, as the details of the project are agreed upon during 
extensive interaction, often over a substantial period of time. Although 
very little research has been done on project negotiations as such, 
established research in the area of negotiation analysis provides a 
theoretically well-founded framework for studying project negotiations. 
This study applies the negotiation analysis framework to describe and 
analyze negotiations in the context of project sales and delivery processes. 
The body of this report first develops an understanding of the concept of 
negotiation and reviews the negotiation analysis approach. Second, the 
project sales and delivery process and its distinctive features are reviewed 
and their implications on negotiations in projects are analyzed. Third, the 
logic and concepts of negotiation analysis are used to describe and analyze 
a selected set of negotiation strategies available to either the client or 
contractor at different phases of a single project.  
The main results of the study include a conceptualization of the project 
sales and delivery process as a negotiation problem, and a qualitative 
description of selected negotiation strategies in terms of negotiation 
analysis. The concepts used (e.g. phases of negotiation, interests, issues, 
and best alternatives to a negotiated agreement) can be applied in practical 
settings for the purposes of training professionals and preparing for 
negotiations, and ultimately for transforming negotiation games in the 
favor of practicing negotiators. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Project business is concerned with complex transactions involving 
products and services which are integrated into “total solutions” to deliver 
certain business benefits within the constraints of time, cost and quality 
(Grönroos 1994, Turner 1999). Project sales and delivery processes entail 
complex negotiations between buyer and seller, as the details of the project 
are agreed upon during extensive buyer-seller interaction, often over a 
substantial period of time (Skaates, Tikkanen & Lindblom 2002). It is 
widely admitted that the parties face significant difficulties in negotiating 
major projects (Cova, Ghauri & Salle 2002), but very little research has 
been done on the project negotiation process (Ghauri & Usunier 1996).  
Concerning negotiations in general, however, there is a whole body of 
research focusing on negotiation as a distinct field of study and a universal 
type of human decision-making process (Bazerman & Neale 1992, Fisher, 
Ury & Patton 1991, Young 1991, Raiffa 1982, Sebenius 1980, Rubin & 
Brown 1975). As a distinguished approach within this body of research, 
negotiation analysis offers a logically consistent framework for studying 
negotiations, essentially based on the model of rational behavior (Sebenius 
1992). Applying the negotiation analysis approach to scarcely researched 
project negotiations constitutes an interesting research subject. The 
negotiation analysis may potentially contribute to the development of a 
systematic project negotiation framework, and, ultimately, to crafting 
better contracts in project business, where complexity and financial 
commitment are often very high. 
1.2 Research orientation 
The main purpose of this study is to apply the negotiation analysis 
approach to the context of project business. Towards this end, this report 
first reviews the negotiation analysis approach to familiarize the audience 
of project business literature with the logic and basic elements of the 
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approach. The negotiation analysis framework is then used to describe and 
analyze a set of selected negotiation strategies that the main project 
counterparts, the client and the main contractor, may employ.  
Acknowledging the ambiguity of the concept of “strategy,” it is important 
to define its meaning in the context of negotiations. The concept of 
“negotiation strategy” in this context refers to generic means to influence 
ultimate payoffs from negotiation situations. A negotiation strategy is 
therefore used to denote any deliberate action, or a complete course of 
action, which a negotiating party may choose to rely on in order to attain 
as favorable outcomes as possible, and could as well be dubbed a 
negotiation maneuver. 
The negotiation analysis approach is a theoretically well-founded 
methodology, which may, due to its generality, serve to integrate insights 
from different approaches to (project) negotiations (Raiffa, Richardson & 
Metcalfe 2002). The logic and the set of concepts employed here are also 
general, and can therefore be applied to various negotiations for 
developing insights into the special characteristics of any given situation 
(Sebenius 1992).  Similarly, the negotiation strategies discussed in this 
study are general, applicable to most situations, in contrast to situational 
particularities. 
A main advantage of the negotiation analysis approach is its conceptual 
clarity, which can be used to stimulate fundamental thinking regarding 
negotiation situations (Raiffa et al. 2002). However, the approach relies 
heavily on the model of rational behavior and does not therefore 
emphasize the issues that arise from focusing on interpersonal and cultural 
styles, on atmosphere, on personality and psychoanalytic motivation, or a 
host of other “softer” aspects relevant to negotiations. We suggest that 
such behavioral and cultural issues can be subjected to empirical research 
and experimentation, once we begin to understand the rational ideal and its 
practical applications in selling and delivering projects. Under the 
assumption of rational decision-making, negotiating parties always 
calculate, i.e. define their objectives, enumerate their alternatives, evaluate 
  - 3 - 
the alternatives against the objectives and choose the best, or “optimum” 
alternative. 
It is also important to acknowledge that there is a diversity of contracts and 
associated delivery systems in project business, with different performance 
measures and behavioral dynamics. The discussion here applies primarily 
to lump sum, fixed duration contracts, which, inarguably, characterize the 
contemporarily predominant contracting method.  
1.3 Structure of report 
This report includes five chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) sets the scene 
for further chapters. The background, motivation, objectives, and research 
orientation of the study were addressed. In Chapter 2, the negotiation 
analytic approach is reviewed. The chapter starts with a more general 
review of the concept of negotiation and outlines previous research on the 
subject. The concepts and logic of negotiation analysis are summarized 
with a visually represented model of the approach.  In Chapter 3, the 
distinctive features of project sales and delivery projects are examined 
from the perspective of negotiations. In Chapter 4, a set of selected project 
negotiation strategies are analyzed using the concepts of negotiation 
analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the results and implications of the 
study. The results include practical implications for managerial project 
sales and delivery applications in project industries. 
A glossary of terms on the end of the report helps the reader with 
understanding the special negotiation terminology needed for 
conceptualizing the phenomenon of negotiation and the application of 
different strategies in negotiations. Furthermore, while reading the report, 
the glossary makes it easier for the reader to re-check the meanings of 
some specific abbreviations that are used throughout the report. 
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2 Negotiation analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
Negotiation is the process of joint decision-making (Young 1991). In 
international politics, negotiation consists of discussions between officially 
designated representatives designed to achieve a formal agreement of their 
governments to the way forward on an issue that is either of shared 
concern or in dispute between them (Berridge 2002). Business 
negotiations, in turn, may be understood as encounters between economic 
organizations with the goal of reaching agreements to provide economic 
benefits (Dupont 2002). In fact, the original meaning of the word 
“negotiation” is simply to carry on business (Webster 2005). 
Negotiations take place in all domains of life, but the structure and pattern 
of negotiations are fundamentally the same at a personal level as they are 
at diplomatic and corporate levels (Lewicki et al. 1999). There are four 
characteristics common to all negotiation situations (Raiffa et al. 2002, 
Lewicki 1992, Rubin & Brown 1975):  
• First, there are two or more parties 
• Second, the parties can cooperate to arrive at a joint decision 
• Third, the payoffs to any party depend either on the consequences of 
the joint decision or alternatives external to the negotiations 
• Fourth, the parties can reciprocally and directly exchange 
information 
Parties may refer to individuals or groups of individuals. However, 
ultimately it is individuals who interact, for their own purposes or as 
agents for groups. The concepts of party, individual, decision maker, 
agent, player, and actor can therefore be considered synonymous in this 
context: they all refer to a single, unitary decision entity. Groups consist of 
plural unitary decision makers, but when their interests are shared enough, 
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an abstraction is often made and a group is treated as a unitary decision 
entity (Raiffa et al. 2002). 
The concept of decision has to do with two important aspects: selection 
and commitment (Mintzberg 1981). If there is only one course of action 
available, no selection can be made, and the concept of decision is 
inapplicable. On the other hand, if an option has been selected, but a party 
does not feel committed to it, no decision has been taken. For example in 
organizations, a plan may have to be ratified by other members before 
organizational commitment can be said to exist.  
In negotiations, the parties must arrive at a joint decision (Raiffa et al. 
2002). The word joint means that the parties must select and commit to a 
common course of action together. A jointly selected, common course of 
action is called an agreement. Zartman (2002) defines negotiation as a 
process by which contending parties come to an agreement.   
An agreement determines a payoff for each party (Sebenius 1992). The 
fundamental objective of negotiations is to jointly select and commit to 
courses of action that are superior to unilateral action for each and every 
party (Raiffa et al. 2002). Parties are motivated to negotiate by payoffs that 
they can not achieve without joint behavior. Negotiation is therefore aimed 
at either creating something that neither party could do on his own, or to 
resolve a problem or dispute between the parties (Lewicki et al 1999). 
Finally, the negotiation process is essentially communication, direct or 
tacit, between individuals who are trying to forge an agreement for mutual 
benefit (Young 1991). Also Kremenyuk (1993) defines negotiation as 
basically purposeful communication between two or more parties. 
Communication is a process by which information is exchanged between 
individuals through a common system of symbols, signs, or behavior 
(Webster 2005).  
Based of the above discussion, negotiation can be defined as “a process of 
joint decision-making where two or more parties communicate to select 
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and commit to a common course of action that is superior to unilateral 
alternatives.” 
At the heart of the subject of negotiation is essentially the insight that 
unilateral, i.e. separate and independent behavior, even if perfectly 
intelligent and calculating, often leaves interacting parties with outcomes 
inferior to what can be achieved through joint behavior. As the classical 
prisoner’s dilemma well illustrates (see e.g. Raiffa et al. 2002), purely self-
serving actions of independent, but interacting parties do not always serve 
the interests of either of the parties in the best possible way. The key 
insight is that numerous social contexts are analogous with the prisoner’s 
dilemma, and negotiations can effectively be considered as a process of 
moving away from less-than optimal outcomes towards increased payoffs, 
and the distribution of those payoffs.     
In an era of growing interdependence, negotiation research has 
experienced a tremendous growth of interest. Key publications in the 
history of negotiations include: Machiavelli’s “The Prince” from the 16th 
century, and Callières’ “On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes” from 
the 18th century. However, it was only in the late 1900’s that research and 
writings on negotiations became a distinct area of study. Work in this area 
began with writings on diplomatic negotiation (Iklé 1987, Zartman & 
Berman 1983). The area of study was broadened by those who regarded 
negotiation as a much more universal type of human activity and an 
inalienable part of the human decision-making processes (Bazerman & 
Neale 1992, Fisher et al. 1991, Raiffa 1982, Sebenius 1980, Rubin & 
Brown 1975). More recently, negotiation research has shifted from being 
exclusively a part of diplomatic or commercial knowledge toward the area 
of management and business (Avenhaus 2001). 
Previous research has shown through simulated experiments that, contrary 
to people’s common beliefs, people on average are not very good at 
negotiating optimal outcomes (Raiffa et al. 2002). The discipline of 
negotiation is still relatively unsystematic and most negotiators have had 
little formal training on the subject (Lewicki, Saunders & Milton 1999). 
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Negotiators predominantly rely on implicit knowledge, individual 
capabilities and situational factors in crafting agreements (Ertel 1999).  
Although experience and sound intuition are at least as important to 
successful negotiation as any amount of analysis, some analysis is 
necessary to correct people’s intuition and to force them to reexamine their 
assumptions (Young 1991). Analytical reasoning, backed up by empirical 
evidence, can deepen ones understanding of real world negotiating 
situations (Raiffa et al. 2002). 
Research has shown that the most common mistake in negotiations is that 
negotiations are perceived as zero-sum games, which demand competitive 
behavior. In other words, central to negotiations is the belief that there is a 
limited, controlled amount of resources to be distributed – a “fixed pie” 
situation (Lewicki et al. 1999, Fisher et al. 1991). However, most 
negotiations also present opportunities for solutions, in which one party’s 
gains do not necessarily come at the other parties’ expense – the gains 
need not be mutually exclusive (ibid.). The fundamental structure of many 
negotiations is such that it allows for solutions, from which one or all 
parties only gain –“expanding the pie”, or a plus-sum situation (Lewicki et 
al. 1999).  
The negotiations in which creating joint value is an obvious opportunity 
are often referred to as integrative, collaborative, win-win or creating 
negotiations (Raiffa et al. 2002, Lewicki et al. 1999, Fisher et al. 1991). 
The negotiations in which the structure presents no or less-obvious 
opportunities for joint gains are referred to as distributive, competitive, 
win-lose or claiming negotiations (ibid.).  
Distributive negotiations are generally concerned with the division of a 
single resource, i.e. there is only one issue under negotiation, and 
behaviorally speaking, they tend to be less collaborative than integrative 
negotiations (Raiffa et al. 2002). Researchers have shown that the failure 
to reach integrative agreements is often linked to the failure to exchange 
information to allow the parties to identify efficient contracts (Kemp & 
Smith 1994, Raiffa et al. 2002). Effective information exchange promotes 
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the development of good integrative solutions (Pruitt 1981, Thompson 
1991). 
Most negotiations actually present a tension between creating joint value, 
i.e. increasing the payoffs to all parties, and claiming individual value, i.e. 
increasing the payoffs to a single party unilaterally, often referred to as the 
“negotiators dilemma” (Raiffa et al. 2002). This is a key distinction central 
to negotiation research and a prevalent setting in most real-world 
negotiations.   
2.2 Negotiation analysis 
2.2.1 Theoretical roots of negotiation analysis 
Negotiation analysis can be characterized as an approach, which builds on 
the theory of games, decision analysis and behavioral decision theory, but 
departs from some of their analytic rigor and formal argumentation in 
order to pursue a broader scope of application and increased practical 
value (Sebenius 1992).  
Game theory provides a logically consistent framework for analyzing 
interdependent decision-making (see e.g. Luce & Raiffa 1957). In game 
theoretic analyses, the parties make their decisions independently of each 
other, but these separate choices interact to determine a payoff for each 
side (Raiffa et al. 2002). Game theory proceeds by applying standard 
utility axioms to abstract the interests of the parties into utility functions. 
An expected utility criterion is used to rank alternative courses of action. 
Full descriptions of the courses of action that can be taken by each party 
are encapsulated into “strategies.” Rigorous analysis of the interaction of 
the strategies leads to search for “equilibria” or complete campaigns of 
action such that each party, given the choices of the other parties, has no 
incentive to change its plans.  
Decision analysis is the systematic decomposition and clarification of a 
decision problem (see e.g. Clemen 1996). Decision analysis studies 
independent decision-making, where the payoffs of decisions are not 
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affected by the decisions of other involved parties, anticipating one’s 
actions (Raiffa et al. 2002). It proceeds by structuring and sequencing the 
party’s choices and chance events, then separating and subjectively 
assessing probabilities and values, as well as risk and time preferences. An 
expected utility criterion is again used to aggregate these elements in 
ranking possible courses of action to determine optimal choice.  
Behavioral decision analysis is concerned with describing how and why 
people think the way they do (Bazerman & Neale 1992). The field has 
identified a number of deviations from the rationality ideal. Such 
deviations are called behavioral errors, biases, heuristics and anomalies 
(see e.g. Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982). Behavioral decision analysis 
gives good descriptions of how the other parties might actually behave, 
and also informs the parties of decision-making fallacies that they are 
susceptible to. 
However, the assumptions required for a game-theoretic analysis are 
invalid for the majority of real-world situations, decision analysis is not 
suited to interdependent decision-making and behavioral decision theory 
lacks prescriptive value. For these limitations, none of the fields of game 
theory, decision analysis, or behavioral decision analysis alone is sufficient 
for the prescriptive study of negotiations. In response, negotiation analysis 
seeks to synthesize contributions from all of these three fields.  
The negotiation analysis approach uses important aspects from the three 
fields of theory described above. Thinking game-theoretically about the 
interaction of separate decisions can help to understand the underlying 
power structure and the opportunities for leverage in negotiations (Raiffa 
et al. 2002). An individual decision-making perspective enables 
comparison of the benefits of a joint agreement with separate or unilateral 
action (ibid.). And behavioral decision analysis can be used in modifying 
one party’s behavior, or for effectively exploiting the behavior of others 
(ibid.).  
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2.2.2 Special features of negotiation analysis 
Although negotiation analysis draws heavily from the three fields of theory 
discussed above in the end of the previous section, the approach has four 
distinct features (Sebenius 1992): An asymmetrically descriptive-
prescriptive orientation, a radically subjective perspective, a sensitivity to 
“value left on the table”, and a focus away from equilibrium analysis and 
toward perceptions of the zone of possible agreement. Each of these four 
distinctive features of negotiation analysis are discussed in the following. 
An asymmetrically prescriptive-descriptive orientation means that 
negotiation analysis typically seeks to develop prescriptive advice to one 
party, given a description of how others will behave (Sebenius 1992). The 
development of asymmetrical advice to one party is in line with decision 
analysis; whereas game theory obliges to consider the behavior of other 
parties; and behavioral decision theory gives descriptions of how the other 
side might behave. In developing advice, the analysis typically assumes 
intelligent, but boundedly rational, self-interest seeking behavior by the 
other parties. Boundedly rational behavior is intended to be rational, in the 
sense of calculatedly maximizing personal utility, but is constrained by 
limited cognitive, temporal or computational capabilities (Simon 1997). 
Self-interest seeking means that a party has goals of its own, which the 
party actively pursues (c.f. Williamson 1985). When commands or 
contracts are ambiguous, a party will make choices in ways consonant with 
his or her self-interests. 
A radically subjective perspective means that the analysis relies heavily on 
subjective sources of information in three respects; (1) assessment of 
probabilities is up to the individuals involved; (2) all subjective 
perceptions of basic interests and more operational objectives are 
considered legitimate. This means that less tangible concerns such as self-
image and relationships can have the same analytic importance as 
economical considerations, such as cost, quality and time (c.f. Ertel 1999, 
Fortgang, Lax & Sebenius 2003); and (3) the other sides’ expected 
behavior is assessed subjectively, in light of available evidence. 
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Sensitivity to “value left on the table” refers to an acknowledgement that 
the negotiating parties do not automatically reach efficient solutions, 
which is often assumed in game theory (Sebenius 1992). One of the main 
purposes of negotiation analysis is to help the parties identify and realize 
potential gains through a systematic study of the negotiation situation 
(Raiffa 1982). 
A focus away from equilibrium analysis and toward perceptions of the 
zone of possible agreement essentially means that the situation is 
incompletely determined (Schelling 1960). In other words, the situation is 
not fixed and cannot be described objectively in full detail, since the 
parties, themselves construct the situation: the game is simply whatever the 
parties act as if it is (Sebenius 2002). For example, the parties can take 
action to introduce new alternatives, to influence the other parties’ 
preferences, or to change their own conditions for an agreement, thus 
changing the zone of possible agreement. An equilibrium analysis is 
impractical if the situation, itself, is subject to modifications. 
2.2.3 Elements of negotiation analysis 
According to Sebenius (1992, 2002), full negotiation analytic accounts 
generally consider the following basic elements with respect to the actual 
and potential parties: the parties’s perceived interests, negotiated issues 
and positions, alternatives to negotiated agreement, the linked processes of 
“creating” and “claiming” value, and efforts to “change the game” itself. 
Accounts that are not exactly identical, but nevertheless highly similar 
have been presented by Raiffa et al. (2002), Lewicki et al. (1999), and 
Fisher et al. (1991). Sebenius (ibid.) claims that these basic elements can 
be found and analyzed in all negotiations, ranging from the simplest 
bilateral negotiation between monolithic parties to the most complex 
coalitional interactions; and they must be interpreted for a meaningful 
negotiation analysis to proceed.  
In this study, the basic concepts of negotiation analysis are reviewed in a 
slightly different order, complemented with some other important 
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concepts, yet consistent with the content of the aforementioned list. The 
idea is to separate concepts that constitute the analytic structure of 
negotiations from the other concepts that refer to behavior (or flow) within 
that structure, respectively. Structure is, in a sense, the snapshot of a 
negotiation situation outside of the time dimension; the flow of 
negotiations refers to the interaction of the structural elements in time. 
Concepts, which define the structure, are: parties, interests, issues, options, 
the best alternatives to negotiated agreements and outcomes.  Outcomes 
can be further broken down to the concepts of contracts, efficiency, 
fairness and impact. Concepts, which refer to the flow of negotiations – or 
behavior within the structure – are: the linked processes of “creating” and 
“claiming” value, efforts to “change the game” itself, and the phase model 
of negotiations. 
2.3 Structure of negotiations 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This study separates concepts that constitute the analytic structure of 
negotiations from the concepts, which refer to behavior within that 
structure, respectively. Structure of negotiations is, in a sense, the snapshot 
of a negotiation situation outside of the time dimension. Concepts, which 
define the structure are: parties, interests, issues, options, ideal alternatives 
to negotiated agreements and outcomes.  Outcomes can be further broken 
down into the concepts of contracts, efficiency, fairness and impact. In the 
following sections, each of the concepts will be discussed in more detail. 
2.3.2 Parties 
The crucial first step in negotiation analysis is to map a full set of 
potentially relevant parties in the context of the decision process (Sebenius 
1992). Negotiation analysis is the study of decision-making between two 
or more individual parties. Negotiation settings are often classified into 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations with respect to the number of parties 
involved. In the simplest negotiation, two principals negotiate with each 
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other and the setting is bilateral. However, contemporary diplomatic and 
commercial settings are increasingly of the multilateral type, involving 
three or more parties. Negotiations can also involve external, “third” 
parties, such as facilitators or mediators, who do not have a direct stake in 
the negotiation setting. From the perspective of any given party, the 
analysis typically assumes intelligent, but boundedly rational, self-interest 
seeking behavior (Sebenius 1992) for all the other parties involved. 
Another key distinction in negotiations is between principals and agents. 
Most negotiations, take place through representatives – agents who are 
empowered to represent a principal and to develop possible agreements 
with their counterparts on the other side (Rubin 2002). There are at least 
three reasons why principals may wish to negotiate through agents: 
substance knowledge, emotional detachment and tactical flexibility. 
First, agents may represent a greater expertise concerning the substantive 
knowledge of the issues under negotiation, or agents may entail valuable 
skills related to the negotiation process (Rubin 2002). Second, agents can 
be chosen due to the emotional detachment they bring to sensitive 
negotiations. This is an idea, which Fisher et al. (1991) captures in the 
idiom: separate the people from problem. Negotiations are not influenced 
by mere economic-legal considerations, but also by multiple socio-
psychological concerns (Ring & Van de Ven 1994). Third, agents may 
confer tactical flexibility, as in pleading lack of authority, when pushed to 
making concessions (Rubin 2002). 
However, the use of agents may introduce problems to the negotiation too. 
First, the presence of parties such as lawyers, bankers and other agents 
may complicate an already complex exchange (Cova & Hoskins 1997). 
Second, introducing agents to a negotiation may create a misalignment of 
interests, since agents may have interests of their own that may be at odds 
with those of the principals (Rubin 2002).  
Finally, the parties also need not be monolithic; instead, there may be 
multiple internal factions with very different interests. In more complex 
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negotiations, an important objective in negotiations is to synchronize 
external (across the table) negotiations with internal ones (on each side of 
the table) (Raiffa et al. 2002).  
2.3.3 Interests 
The purpose of negotiations is to serve the interests of the parties (Fisher et 
al. 1991). Interests are the measure against which possible agreements are 
evaluated. In virtually all cases, the first analytic step after identifying the 
negotiating parties is to probe deeply for interests and separate them from 
the issues under negotiation, on which positions are taken (Sebenius 1992). 
The parties’ interests can be fully convergent (they value the same 
outcomes), fully divergent (they value different outcomes) or, most often, 
somewhere in between. 
Negotiation theorists and decision theorists use different terminology for 
the same idea (Raiffa et al. 2002). For example, Fisher et al. (1991) 
emphasize the role of interests, but decision analysts talk about objectives 
(Clemen 1996). It may be helpful to distinguish between basic, 
fundamental interests and more operational objectives; nevertheless, the 
idea is to define for each party the criteria with which they evaluate 
negotiated agreements.  
The most powerful interests are basic human needs, such as security, 
recognition and a sense of identity (Fisher et al. 1991). For a more 
elaborate classification in the context of negotiations, Lax and Sebenius 
(1986) distinguish between four sets of interests. First, substantive interests 
relate to the economical and legal values of the parties. Second, process 
interests relate to values regarding the manner in which negotiations are 
conducted. Third, relationship interests are the values connected to the 
social dimension of the negotiation. Fourth, principle interests relate to 
ethical, customary and cultural values. It is important to note that in almost 
all business negotiations, each side will have many interests in addition to 
monetary concerns (Fisher et al. 1991). 
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2.3.4 Issues 
Where interests are the measure against which possible agreements are 
evaluated, issues constitute the content of agreements.  Negotiators need to 
decide what needs to be decided. Therefore, each issue under negotiation is 
basically a decision variable, with two or more possible resolution levels - 
an issue with only one possible resolution leaves nothing to negotiate 
about. In the simplest negotiation, there is only one issue to be decided, 
e.g. price; more complex negotiations may list hundreds of issues.  
Moreover, there is no restriction as to what issues are included in or 
excluded from negotiations. Raiffa et al. (2002) introduce the principle of 
reciprocal inclusivity, which states that negotiations should include all 
issues of relevance to all parties. In practice, however, the issues under 
negotiation are a subject of negotiation in their own right.  
Negotiations involve multiple parties cooperating to arrive at a joint 
decision on a number of issues. This is a fundamental difference between 
negotiations and games, which involve multiple individuals making 
separate decisions that interact. Issues need joint decisions, and essentially 
constitute the interdependency of negotiation situations.  
Sometimes literature or practitioners refer to the term “non-negotiable 
issues”. In negotiation analysis parlance, non-negotiable issues are not 
really issues to be decided upon, but in fact, fixed and rigid options on 
certain issues that could have a range of resolutions available from the 
perspective of some party. 
2.3.5 Options  
In addition to deciding on the issues to be resolved, negotiators need to 
determine a set of possible resolutions, called options, for each issue. 
Ultimately, the task for the negotiators will be to select and commit to a 
particular option for each of the issues under negotiation. Options are 
basically the ranges of the decision variables in decision analytic 
terminology. Like the issues under negotiation, options need not be fixed. 
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The introduction of new options translates to expanding the range of the 
decision variables. In fact, negotiation theorists typically recommend 
inventing new, creative options in the course of negotiations (Fisher et al. 
1991, Raiffa et al. 2002).  
The term negotiation “position” refers to a situation where a party insists 
on selecting a particular option for a certain issue. Negotiators are often 
tempted to focus on positions instead of interests, although the objective of 
negotiations is to satisfy underlying interests (Fisher et al. 1991). 
Therefore, a distinction between end values, and means to satisfy end 
values is important. Similarly, Keeney (1992) argues that the key to 
effective decision-making is value-focused thinking, in contrast to 
alternative-focused thinking, which constrains attention to present 
alternatives.  
In negotiation terminology, a distinction is often made between the 
external alternatives that each party can pursue if the negotiations break 
down and the internal alternatives that might be jointly negotiated and 
jointly pursued. The term alternative is reserved for solo choices external 
to negotiations and the term option for collective choices internal to 
negotiations (Raiffa et al. 2002). 
2.3.6 Best alternatives to negotiated agreement 
Parties negotiate in order to better satisfy the complete range of their 
interests through some jointly determined action than could otherwise be 
done. (Sebenius 1992). In practically all situations, negotiators have 
outside alternatives that they can turn to, should they fail to reach an 
agreement in current negotiations. The Best of the Alternatives to a 
Negotiated Agreement is denoted by the acronym BATNA (Fisher et al. 
1991). This is a game theoretic component underlying every negotiation: a 
party always has the option of taking unilateral action to pursue payoffs 
outside of the negotiations (Raiffa 1982). Thus a basic test of a proposed 
agreement is whether it offers a better payoff than that side’s best 
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alternative course of action outside of the negotiations (Sebenius 1992). 
This condition is also known as individual rationality (Young 1991).  
The payoff of each player’s BATNA, therefore, places a lower priority on 
the payoff that the party must realize from a negotiated settlement. Taken 
together, these minimum payoffs define the disagreement point, an 
equivalent of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium concept (Raiffa et al. 
2002). The region of agreements beyond each party’s BATNA, in the 
direction of increasing payoffs, delineates the agreements that are 
individually rational for both parties.  
Alternatives to negotiated agreement also play a tactical role. The more 
favorable alternative courses of action negotiators have, the smaller the 
need for the negotiation and the higher the standard of value that 
negotiators can expect from any proposed agreement (Sebenius 1992).  
Research shows that negotiators with more attractive BATNA’s capture a 
greater share of the negotiation zone (Chen, Mannix, Okumura 2003). 
Therefore, maneuvering “away from the table” can also strongly affect 
negotiated outcomes, even more than the strategies employed “at the 
table.” Searching for a better price or an alternative supplier are examples 
of developing alternatives away from the negotiation table. 
2.3.7 Outcomes 
2.3.7.1 Contract 
The ultimate aim of negotiations is to attain favorable outcomes (Underdal 
2002). The fixing of an option for each of the issues is combined to create   
a contract, which determines the payoff to each party as measured by the 
degree to which the contract satisfies the interests of the party. The set of 
all payoff combinations associated with the various possible agreements is 
called the contract set. The number of possible contracts is the product of 
the number of resolutions for each issue. Under standard assumptions 
about the players’ payoff, or utility, functions, the contract set is convex, 
i.e. bowed outward (Young 1991). 
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Important concepts related to a contract include: feasibility, the zone of 
possible agreement, surplus, potential, domination, and efficiency. A 
contract is said to be feasible if it is individually rational for each party, 
that is, it assigns for each party a payoff that is at least as good as that 
party’s BATNA. The set of feasible contracts is called the zone of possible 
agreement (ZOPA). For any contract, the surplus to a party is the 
difference between the payoffs associated with that contract and the 
party’s BATNA. The concept of potential refers to the maximum surplus a 
party can receive, associated with a contract, where the other parties’ 
surpluses are zero, i.e. their payoffs are driven to their BATNA levels. A 
contract is dominated if there is another contract that leaves none of the 
parties worse off and is preferred by at least one party. The efficient 
boundary consists of the complete set of non-dominated contracts. A 
contract is thus efficient if all potential gains are realized. In other words, 
the payoffs to any single party cannot be unilaterally improved without 
worsening the payoffs to some other party.  
2.3.7.2 Fairness 
Fairness is an important concept in negotiations, but somewhat more 
challenging to define than the previous concepts. Fairness is concerned 
with the problem of selecting an equitable contract that all parties are 
willing to commit to. Fairness is a concept usually not included in 
economical analysis; yet, it is present in most real-world settings. For 
example, people customarily discuss the outcome of labor negotiations, 
divorce suits and even business deals in terms of fairness or unfairness to 
the parties concerned (Young 1991). Experienced negotiators often frame 
their arguments in terms of fair share, such as precedents and principles, 
customary procedure, splitting the difference, reciprocity and so on 
(Underdal 2002). 
The set of feasible contracts consists of multiple possible contracts; and 
even focusing the selection on the set of efficient contracts typically leaves 
many possible agreements. It is reasonable to assume that negotiators seek 
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to achieve efficient contracts, but it is also realistic to assume that the 
parties are concerned with a fair distribution of net benefits (Underdal 
2002). For example, a contract, which realizes all the potential for one 
side, but leaves another party indifferent between his or her BATNA and 
the proposed contract, is efficient, but hardly fair and may consequently 
turn out indurable (Young 1991).  
In a similar vein, in an exposition of interorganizational cooperation Ring 
& Van de Ven (1994) argue that efficiency and equity are essential 
conditions for cooperative interorganizational relationships to emerge and 
be sustained. They define efficiency as a condition, where the parties can 
achieve better payoffs through cooperation than through unilateral action. 
Essentially, they refer to what is understood as individual rationality in this 
study. That is, all feasible contracts are efficient, whereas in this study the 
concept of efficiency is reserved for feasible, non-dominated contracts.  
Ring & Van de Ven (Ibid.) define equity as fair sharing, as perceived by 
the parties. In their definition, equity does not mean equal amounts; 
instead, reciprocity and proportional sharing of benefits. In this study the 
proportional sharing of benefits can be understood with respect to the 
concept of potential. To review, the concept of potential refers to the 
maximum surplus a party can receive, associated with a contract, where 
the other parties’ payoffs are driven to their BATNA levels. It is thus 
possible to examine the proportion of potential a contract assigns to each 
of the parties. A fair sharing would then refer to a contract that gives each 
party a similar proportion of their potential. 
Literature describes many other approaches to fairness in negotiations, but 
they all refer to the same idea, the problem of picking an equitable contract 
from multiple alternatives. According to Young (1991), there are two basic 
approaches to determine a fair outcome: fairness standard and a fair 
procedure.  
The specific fairness standards that are applicable in a given situation vary 
widely from one class of negotiation to another. In wage negotiations it 
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would be normal to tie wage increase to industry norm; in sharing the 
profits of joint ventures, it would be natural to allocate rewards in 
proportion to some measure of contribution, e.g. investment (Young 1991). 
In strictly analytic settings, it is possible to employ various fairness 
concepts, such as the maximum criterion, the mid-mid criterion, the 
Maimonides solution, or the cooperative Nash equilibrium (Raiffa et al. 
2002). As a general remark of these solutions, it is worthwhile to note that 
they all basically result in an agreement in the “middle” region of the 
efficient frontier. 
The alternative to fairness standards is to rely on a fairness procedure. For 
example, when two children must share a piece of cake, it is customary for 
one to divide it in to two pieces and for the other to get first choice; or the 
children might toss a coin to randomly determine allocation. A fairness 
procedure may also involve the use of a third party, such as an arbitrator, 
to whom the negotiating parties turn to for determining a fair outcome. 
Examples of formalized arbitration procedures include the combined 
arbitration, the two-stage final offer arbitration and the multi-stage final 
offer arbitration (Brams, Kilgour & Merrill III 1991). 
There are multiple reasons for involving considerations of fairness in 
negotiations. They help focus negotiations by narrowing the range of 
possible agreements (Young 1991). Fairness considerations also enhance 
the durability of contracts (ibid.). A further benefit is that standards of 
fairness relieve bargainers of responsibility for having given in. It converts 
what might otherwise degenerate into a contest of wills into a principled or 
objective solution that can be justified – both to the negotiators and to their 
constituents (Fisher et al. 1991). 
2.3.7.3 Impact  
Finally, an important distinction related to outcomes is between expected 
payoffs, i.e. the contract, and actual payoffs, i.e. the impact (Underdal 
2002). The signing of a contract, or in other words the joint selection and 
commitment to a complete course of action specifies the rights and 
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obligations of each party, with associated payoffs. It is important to note, 
however, that the payoffs at the time of the signing of the contract are 
expected payoffs, and are likely to be different from the actual payoffs 
resulting from implementing the jointly selected course of action.  
The actual payoffs of a contract can be different for at least four reasons, 
arising essentially from the inclusion of the time dimension. The first 
reason is uncertainty regarding the future situation to which an agreement 
is applied. A considerable amount of uncertainty pertains to, for example, 
contracts fixing the price and scope of long-term transactions. Although 
contracts may embody contingencies such as future price fluctuations, 
most contracts are incomplete in the sense that they do not specify a 
response to all possible disturbances that may arise in the implementation 
of the chosen course of action (Underdal 2002). 
Second, parties may adapt their resources in the course of implementation, 
thus affecting the payoffs. For example, a party may improve its processes 
required for implementing the contract from the expectations at the time of 
the signing of the contract, which may result in decreased costs, or 
conversely, increased payoffs (Underdal 2002).  
Third, in some cases the sheer complexity of the cooperative arrangement, 
the number of variables and their interdependencies, may be such that no 
actor can predict the aggregate future impact with great precision and 
confidence (Winham 1977).  
Fourth, even when the consequences can be predicted, the evaluation 
criteria, the interests of the parties themselves may change over time (Ikle 
1964). 
2.4 Flow of negotiations 
2.4.1 Introduction 
This study separates concepts that constitute the analytic structure of 
negotiations from the concepts, which refer to behavior within that 
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structure, respectively. The flow of negotiations is the interaction of the 
structural elements in time. Concepts, which refer to the flow of 
negotiations, i.e. behavior within the structure are the linked processes of 
“creating” and “claiming” value; efforts to “change the game” itself; and 
the phase model of negotiations. In the following sections, each of these 
will be discussed in more depth. 
2.4.2 Behavior of creating and claiming value 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, most negotiations actually present a 
tension between creating joint value, i.e. increasing the payoffs to all 
parties, and claiming individual value, i.e. increasing the payoffs to a 
single party unilaterally, often referred to as the “negotiators dilemma” 
(Raiffa et al. 2002). Many negotiation approaches naively ignore this 
tension by simply advocating either a win-win or win-lose philosophy 
(Sebenius 1992). Equipped with the basic concepts of negotiation analysis 
discussed so far, it is possible to elaborate on this subject. The elaboration 
begins with the extreme case of purely distributive (zero-sum game) 
negotiations. 
In a purely distributive negotiation, the relationship between the payoffs to 
each of the parties is strictly negative, such as in bargaining the price of a 
used car. The zone of possible agreement collapses to a diagonal frontier, 
which holds out, what can be termed as the distributive potential. In a 
purely distributive negotiation, only claiming behavior is possible. 
Increasing the payoffs to one side necessitates an equal decrease in the 
payoffs to the other side. Several broad classes of tactics used for claiming 
value have been explored (Schelling 1960, Raiffa 1982, Lax & Sebenius 
1986). 
In an integrative bargain (plus-sum game), the payoffs to the parties do not 
have a strictly negative correspondence, such as in negotiating the terms of 
a joint venture. The zone of possible agreement includes contracts, which 
are not placed on a diagonal frontier, which means that the zone of 
possible agreement holds out integrative potential. Where integrative 
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potential exists, searching for joint gains is possible, i.e. the payoffs to one 
or both sides can be improved without weakening the payoffs to any party. 
The principles and approaches used for creating value have been explored 
by several authors, and include principled negotiation (Fisher et al. 1991), 
single negotiation text (SNT) (Raiffa 1982), the method of jointly 
improving direction (Ehtamo, Kettunen & Hämälainen 2001), and 
integrative negotiation strategy (Lewicki et al. 1999).  
The existence of integrative potential arises from three possible sources 
(Sebenius 2002). First, apart from pure shared interests, the negotiating 
parties may simply want the same settlement on some issues. Second, 
where economies of scale exist, agreement among negotiators can create 
joint gains. Third, though negotiators commonly think that differences 
divide people, differences are actually the main source of integrative 
potential. Differences in preferences related to any of the negotiated issues 
or for example time, risk attitude, technical capabilities, market access, tax 
status, and valuations of tradable goods create more opportunities for joint 
gains. 
At this point it is possible to also clarify the idea of win-win and win-lose 
negotiations. Even in a purely distributive bargain, if a contract is better 
than each party’s BATNA, the contract is essentially a win-win solution, 
i.e. each party’s surplus is positive – none of the parties really loses in the 
deal, although one party may claim a larger share of the distributive 
potential. Likewise, in integrative negotiations, the acceptance of a 
contract beyond each party’s BATNA presupposes a positive surplus – and 
any contract is again essentially a win-win solution. A contract beyond one 
party’s BATNA would imply a win-lose contract, and the observation that 
“no contract is the best option” for that party. 
In distributive bargains the behavior of the parties are reduced to mere 
claiming, in other words, win-lose action. On the other hand, where 
integrative potential exists, the parties can jointly search, identify and 
select contracts, which improve the payoffs jointly with reference to any 
tentative agreement or negotiation text. When such action characterizes 
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negotiations, the negotiations take on the notion of a win-win process. It is 
therefore reasonable to distinguish between win-win agreements (any 
feasible contract beyond the parties BATNAs) and win-win behavior (joint 
improvement of a contract).  
Negotiation analysis recognizes claiming and creating as two fundamental 
classes of negotiation behavior. However, some authors distinguish three 
general negotiation behavioral postures for moving toward agreement 
(Rubin, Pruitt & Kim 1994), while other authors recognize four different 
behaviors, or “strategies” (Lewicki et al. 1999). Yet, these strategies can 
easily be interpreted from the perspective of negotiation analysis. Table 1 
introduces four distinctive behaviors. The first behavior is contending, the 
second problem solving, the third yielding, and the fourth avoidance. 
Table 1 Negotiation strategies 
Strategy Description 
Contending 
Negotiators pursue their interests by persuading the other 
party to concede. This refers to claiming in the 
negotiation analytic parlance.  
Problem-Solving 
Negotiators try to identify options that satisfy both 
parties’ interests. This refers to what is termed creating 
behavior in negotiation analysis.  
Yielding Negotiators diminish their aspirations, concede and give in; in other words “negative” claiming. 
Avoidance 
Negotiators simply do not engage in negotiations or 
disengage from them. The strategy can be understood and 
explained with reference to an attractive BATNA in 
negotiation analysis. 
 
The choice of a negotiation behavior is not completely arbitrary. 
Distributive negotiation settings enable only claiming, yielding or 
avoidance. Whereas in integrative settings creating, or synonymously 
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problem solving is possible, but claiming, yielding and avoidance remain 
available to the negotiators.  
The chosen posture and consequent behavior influence the construction of 
the perceived ZOPA (Raiffa et al. 2002, Sebenius 2002). For example, 
competitive moves to claim value individually often drive out moves to 
create it jointly (Sebenius 1992). Tough behavior may hamper efforts to 
identify joint gains, and therefore negotiators cannot simply alternate 
between creating and claiming action. Creating and claiming behavior are 
not separable phenomena (or “strategies”) in reality (Schelling 1960). 
Negotiators need to manage the tension between creating and claiming 
behavior (Raiffa et al. 2002).  
Negotiators need to also adjust their negotiation stance with respect to their 
counterparts. In general, reciprocal open and truthful sharing of 
information and creativity help the parties identify integrative potential 
(Pruitt 1981, Thompson 1991). Yet, if only one party is open and 
forthcoming, the other party can opportunistically take advantage of this 
and claim a greater share of value (Sebenius 2002). If both parties take 
tough and even hostile stances, the negotiations are characterized by 
claiming behavior, the parties are unlikely to identify integrative potential 
and fail to realize potential gains (Young 1991). 
This highlights the importance of trust in negotiations. In the presence of 
trust, the parties assume absence of opportunistic behavior by the other 
parties and can confide more information, resulting in better agreements, 
and consequently in even more trust (Figure 1). The relationship between 
trust, sharing of information and the quality of agreements is essentially 
positive and cyclical (Ertel 1999).  
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Figure 1 Positive relationship between trust, communication and agreements in 
negotiations 
2.4.3 Efforts to change the game 
The framework of negotiation as represented by the concepts discussed so 
far is, of course, an idealization of actual negotiation situations. 
Negotiation is not simply creating and claiming within a fixed 
configuration of the elements of negotiation. The behavioral dynamics of 
claiming and creating influence the construction of the perceived ZOPA, 
but the parties can also take deliberate purposive action to change the 
negotiation game (Sebenius 2002). Therefore, an important form of 
behavior and analysis in negotiations is to change the ZOPA, or at least to 
change the way in which other players perceive it (Sebenius 1992, 2002). 
The elements of the interaction may evolve or be intentionally changed. 
Typically, the parties do not know each other’s payoffs with any 
reasonable degree of accuracy, and most often negotiators are not even 
sure of their own (Sebenius 2002). Moreover, they do not know each 
other’s, and at the same time they may be hard at working trying to 
improve their own. In general each party has its own perceptions of the 
location of the disagreement point and the shape of the utility frontier 
(Young 1991).  
In other words, the game is incompletely determined, so the parties need 
not limit themselves to creating and claiming within a fixed configuration 
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of the elements of negotiation; instead, they can take purposive action to 
change them. The parties typically seek to learn about their own and the 
other side’s situation and what is jointly possible; to advantageously 
influence their own or the others’, actual or perceived BATNA; and to 
favorably change the parties, issues or options under negotiation. The most 
important intentional efforts to change the game entail: improvement of 
own BATNA, worsening of other’s BATNA, credible commitment to a 
negotiation position and introduction of mutually beneficial options.  
An improvement in a party’s BATNA changes the ZOPA in a way more 
favorable to that side (Raiffa et al. 2002): the minimum a party can expect 
from the negotiations at hand increases. If the other party’s BATNA 
worsens, again the ZOPA changes in favor of the party: the minimum the 
counterpart can expect from the negotiations decreases. A successful 
commitment to a negotiation position changes the BATNA by cutting off 
an undesirable part of the ZOPA for the party who makes it (Sebenius 
1992). Introduction of a new, mutually beneficial option causes the 
integrative potential to increase (Axelrod 1970): a seemingly distributive 
negotiation can be transformed into an integrative one. In general, when 
parties, interests, issues, options, BATNAs, or perceptions of any of them 
vary, the ZOPA will be transformed. 
2.4.4 Phase model of negotiations 
Although the negotiation analytic approach is consistent and complete as 
such, for the purposes of this study, a conceptual model of the negotiation 
process is needed. To be more specific, the objective is to frame the project 
sales and delivery process in terms of negotiation, which benefits from a 
model of the process of negotiations.  
The negotiation analysis approach as outlined by Sebenius (1992) does not 
acknowledge any generic and sequential phases in the negotiation process. 
Yet, several researchers who have studied the flow of negotiations over 
time have confirmed that negotiation, like communication in problem-
solving groups and in other forms of ritualistic social interaction proceeds 
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through distinct phases or stages (Douglas 1962, Morley & Stephenson 
1997). Holmes (1992) states that phase models provide a narrative 
explanation of negotiation processes; that is, they identify sequences of 
events that constitute the pattern of negotiation.  
The fundamental idea of phase models of decision-making is that the 
elements of decisions are not assumed to be present and fixed, but 
conceived in time (Noorderhaven 1995). This idea is in alignment with the 
distinctive features of the negotiation analysis approach; and essentially 
recognized in the element of “efforts to change the game.” It therefore 
seems reasonable to assume that a phase model for organizing the study of 
negotiations is consistent with the negotiation analysis approach. The 
purpose of the phase model is to describe the general pattern with which 
the elements (e.g. interests, issues, BATNAs) of negotiation analysis are 
constructed. 
Lewicki et al. (1999) come to the conclusion that the various models of 
negotiation fit nicely into a general structure of three phases, or stages: 
initiation, problem-solving and resolution. In a treatise of the theory and 
practice of diplomacy, Berridge (2002) adopts a similar, three-stage model: 
pre-negotiations, around-the-table negotiations and packaging agreements.  
The origin of a three stage model can be traced to Simon (1960), who 
describes three stages of decision-making in his early and highly 
influential work “The new science of management decision:” intelligence, 
design and choice. In the intelligence phase, the need to make a decision is 
recognized, intelligence is gathered, stakeholders are identified and the 
general decision problem definition is formulated. In the design phase 
objectives are set, options are generated and options are evaluated against 
the outcomes they produce. In the choice phase, a choice is made, the 
choice is implemented and the implementation process is controlled. This 
conceptual model of three sequential phases (Figure 2) is generic and 
therefore applicable irrelevant of whether decision-making is concerned 
with individual; interactive, but separate; or joint decisions (negotiations).  
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Figure 2 General, three-stage model of negotiation 
 
The elements of negotiation analysis can be related to the three-stage 
model as follows (Figure 2):  
In the intelligence, or pre-negotiations phase, the need to negotiate is 
recognized; parties are identified; intelligence on the interests and 
BATNAs of both own and the other parties are gathered; and the general 
issues under negotiation are defined.  
In the design, or around the table phase, the parties define their own 
interests; determine the specific issues to be negotiated and a set of options 
for each issue; and evaluate the different combinations of options 
(contracts) with respect to their interests.  
In the choice, or packaging the agreement phase, the parties jointly select 
and commit to a common negotiation contract; and finally implement and 
control the implementation of the  contract. 
This model is, of course an idealization of reality, and as reviewed in the 
behavioral elements of “claiming and creating” as well as, “efforts to 
change the game,” the elements of the interaction are path dependent and 
they may evolve or be intentionally changed throughout the process. 
2.5 Summary of negotiation analysis 
The concepts of the approach form a logically consistent, complete 
framework oriented around the perceptions of the zone of possible 
agreement, ZOPA (Sebenius 2002). The general representation below 
(Figure 3) can visually summarize the framework of negotiation analysis, 
with respect to the simplest negotiation between two parties, A and B.  
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Figure 3 Visual summary of the concepts of negotiation analysis 
Negotiations involve a set of two or more parties, which determine the 
axes in Figure 3. The parties are bound interdependent by the issues under 
negotiation. Each of the issues has two or more options. The fixing of an 
option for each of the issues combines into a contract, which is evaluated 
with respect to the parties’ interests to produce a measure of payoff for 
each of the parties. The set of payoffs associated with all possible 
combinations of agreements represents the contract set available. Best 
alternatives to negotiated agreements (BATNAs) represent the constraints, 
which together with the contract set define the zone of possible agreement 
(ZOPA). The intersection of the parties’ BATNAs represents the payoffs 
of failing to reach agreement. The efficient frontier represents the set of 
contracts that cannot be improved from the standpoint of one party without 
harming another. Within this configuration, the process of negotiation 
consists of creating and claiming behavior, and efforts to change the game, 
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itself. Figure 3 illustrates how sequential claiming and creating activities 
result in a final contract, by starting from a point of tentative settlement. 
Negotiation, like other forms of ritualistic social interaction proceeds 
through distinct phases or stages, which constitute a pattern of negotiation. 
The construction of the ZOPA and proceeding of negotiations can be 
captured in a phase model with three distinct phases: intelligence (or pre-
negotiations), design (or around the table), and choice (or packaging the 
agreement) phase. In a phase model the elements of negotiations are not 
assumed to be present and fixed, but are conceived and are path dependent 
in time. It is also important to note that the construction of a quantitative 
model of the ZOPA may be impossible for sophisticated real-world 
negotiators even under the assumption of perfectly cooperative behavior.  
However, a conceptual understanding of negotiation as a phenomenon, and 
understanding of related conscious or unconscious managerial practices is 
important. For creating such understanding, the clarity of concepts and a 
structured model is important, to which Figure 3 attempts to contribute. A 
qualitative understanding of the structure of negotiations may guide the 
negotiators in crafting better agreements (Raiffa et al. 2002). Table 2 
verbally summarizes the main concepts of negotiation analysis.  
Table 2 Description of the main concepts of negotiation analysis 
Concept Description 
Parties 
Parties are either principals who negotiate with each other or 
their representatives. The analysis typically assumes 
intelligent, but boundedly rational, self-interest seeking 
behavior by the other parties. 
Interests 
Interests are the measure against which possible agreements 
are evaluated. Negotiators need to identify all relevant 
criteria, with which to evaluate agreements. 
Issues 
Issues constitute the content of agreements.  Negotiators 
need to decide what needs to be decided. Each issue under 
negotiation is basically a decision variable. 
  - 32 - 
Options 
Options represent possible resolutions for each issue. 
Negotiators need to determine a set of possible resolutions, 
called options, for each issue. Options are basically the 
ranges of the decision variables. 
BATNA 
Negotiators have outside alternatives that they can turn to, 
should they fail to reach an agreement in current 
negotiations. A basic test of a proposed agreement is 
whether it offers a better payoff than that side’s best 
alternative course of action (BATNA) outside the 
negotiation. 
Contract 
Ultimately, the task for the negotiators will be to select and 
commit to a particular option for each of the issues under 
negotiation, which combines into a contract. A contract 
determines a payoff to each party as measured by the degree 
the contract satisfies the interests of the parties.  
Fairness 
Fairness is concerned with the problem of selecting an 
equitable contract from multiple alternatives, to which all 
parties are willing to commit. There are two basic 
approaches to determine a fair outcome: fairness standard 
and a fair procedure. 
Impact The actual payoffs, the impact, often deviate from those implied by the expected payoffs, the contract. 
Claiming and 
creating 
behavior 
Most negotiations present a tension between creating joint 
value, i.e. increasing the payoffs to all parties, and claiming 
individual value, i.e. increasing the payoffs to a single party 
unilaterally. 
Efforts to 
change the 
game 
The elements of the negotiation may evolve or be 
intentionally changed. Each side typically seeks to learn 
about its own and the other side’s situation and what is 
jointly possible; to advantageously influence its own or the 
other’s, actual or perceived BATNA; and to favorably 
change the parties, issues or options under negotiation. 
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3 Project negotiations 
3.1 Introduction 
Project negotiations extend far beyond the tactical considerations 
associated with competitive bidding (Cova, Mazet & Salle 1994), and it is 
widely admitted that parties face great difficulties in negotiating major 
projects (Cova et al. 2002). Essentially, the client and the contractor face 
the problem of identifying and distributing potential payoffs offered by 
joint behavior. Even when a project is awarded through a call for tender, 
the client and contractor need to make joint decisions in negotiating 
important details of the deal and, often, throughout the project delivery 
process. For a project to realize, a significant amount of joint decision-
making needs to take place. 
There is a growing body of research focusing on projects as a distinct type 
of business. An explication of the distinctive features of project business 
may provide a more structured view as to why negotiation is so important 
in the project context and why project negotiations are typically 
challenging. For this purpose, it is helpful to first distinguish between two 
disciplines in project literature: project management and project marketing.  
The project management literature defines a project as a temporary 
organization, to which resources are assigned to undertake a unique, novel 
and transient endeavor, managing the inherent uncertainty and need for 
integration in order to deliver beneficial objectives of change (Turner & 
Müller 2003). In the project marketing approach (Cova et al. 2002), a 
project is defined as a complex business transaction covering a package of 
products, services and work, specifically designed to create capital assets 
that produce benefits for a buyer over an extended period of time. The 
project marketing approach focuses on project business more broadly as 
interaction between clients and contractors, emphasizing the concept of a 
transaction (Cova & Salle 2004).  
The broader focus of the project marketing approach on project business as 
interaction between clients and contractors and the implicit inclusion of the 
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project management term make the project marketing discipline more 
suitable for explicating the distinctive features of project business from a 
negotiation perspective. However, in this study the term project marketing 
is used in a more constrained sense to denote the sales and delivery of a 
single project. The main characteristics which distinguish project 
marketing from other types of business-to-business marketing, and 
simultaneously reveal some of the distinctive features of project business 
in general are captured in the D-U-C model (Cova & Ghauri 1996, Skaates 
& Tikkanen 2003), where D stands for discontinuity, U for uniqueness and 
C for complexity.   
3.2 Features of project negotiations 
The nature of each distinctive features of project business, discontinuity, 
uniqueness and complexity, will be discussed in more detail in the 
following. Next, the implications of each of the three characteristics on 
negotiations are discussed. 
Discontinuity refers to the nature of economic relations between clients 
and their contractors (Cova & Hoskins 1997). The sales and delivery of a 
project is essentially a discrete, although an inter-temporal phenomenon. 
Even if a contractor experiences a relatively continuous demand on an 
aggregate level, project transactions between a particular client and a 
contractor are episodic, and therefore their economic relationships are best 
characterized as discontinuous. Projects are conceived with the intention of 
delivering one-off transformational changes, which cannot be achieved 
through improvements in the existing operations (Cova & Hoskins 1997). 
Contractors are, in fact, faced with the problem of maintaining purposeful 
contacts with potential customers during extended periods of economic 
inactivity, with the aim of being called for negotiations if and when future 
projects materialize (Hadjikhani 1996). 
Uniqueness in project business means that each project may be 
characterized as an isolated market for goods and services (Cova & 
Hoskins 1997). Projects are complex transactions involving products and 
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services, which are often delivered on an engineered-to-order basis. The 
final deliverable generally involves major, client-specific, tailored or 
customized features. Even the simplest projects involve such features, 
leading to the notion of “standardized prototypes.” Moreover, even if the 
object of exchange, the total solution delivered to a client is standardized, 
the process of completing the transaction may involve, for example, novel 
socio-political features.  
Complexity in selling and delivering projects refers primarily to the 
number of actors involved throughout the acquisition and delivery process 
(Cova & Ghauri 1996). Beside the multiple representatives on the sides of 
the client and the contractor, many additional stakeholders may be 
involved in the definition and implementation of a project. These 
stakeholders may include government departments, trade unions, non-
governmental action groups, subcontractors, financiers, and legislative 
bodies. Bringing together the necessary resources from within the client’s 
and contractor’s network of external partners adds to the complexity of 
each transaction (Cova & Hoskins 1997).  
The discontinuous, unique and complex nature of projects contributes to 
the challenge and importance of negotiations in project business. In the 
following, the implications of each of the three characteristics on 
negotiations are introduced. 
The discontinuity feature may imply that a project delivery is often 
considered as a single-shot delivery, followed by a long ‘sleeping time’ 
until the contractor has an opportunity to deliver another project to the 
same customer. Thus, the discontinuity feature implies that the client and 
contractor cannot rely on stable processes of interaction. Instead, intense 
negotiations in the project development period determine to a great extent 
the economic success of either party. And although the parties are tempted 
to hammer out advantageous terms, or to engage in opportunistic behavior 
(take advantage of the other party when circumstances permit) to increase 
the payoffs on any single project, they need to balance short term payoffs 
with long term gains. Alajoutsijärvi (1996) has shown that individual 
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projects should be understood with reference to a longer time horizon, in 
which multiple projects as well as periods of inactivity take place. 
Håkansson and Snehota (1989) crystallize this observation in the remark 
“no business is an island.” 
Moreover, although projects should be understood with reference to a 
longer time horizon, it is important to also realize that they are not 
transactional market events (Skaates & Tikkanen 2003). Instead, projects 
are economic exchanges that proceed in time. Consequently, negotiations 
even within a single project are not generally one-off events, but recurring 
joint decision-making. The negotiation of the project contract is not really 
negotiation of the final contract, since renegotiations, initiated by, for 
example variation orders are often necessary throughout the project sales 
and delivery process. In addition, the inherently uncertain nature of the 
future exposes the project delivery system to numerous possible 
disturbances, which may influence negotiated payoffs and trigger 
renegotiations. 
The uniqueness of each project means that the final deliverable is not a 
standardized good, which the parties have complete information about. 
Projects may include hundreds of issues to be negotiated, multiple options 
for each issue, resulting in an enormous amount of possible contracts. 
Negotiations are needed to uncover the possible contracts, the fundamental 
interests of the client, the terms of the agreement, and settle disagreements, 
which may arise. The combination of parties, interests, issues to be 
negotiated, possible resolutions for each issue, the parties BATNAs and 
behavioral dynamics are essentially unique for each project. The 
implication is that in the absence of routine terms, the ability to influence 
outcomes through negotiations increases significantly. 
The complexity, or the number of stakeholders, means that extensive 
negotiations are needed to distribute payoffs and ensure commitment to the 
project on part of all relevant actors. The more parties are involved in the 
negotiation, the more complex the negotiations usually are. More 
specifically, complexity is increased, because new parties usually represent 
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new interests to be satisfied, new issues to be negotiated, new ranges of 
options, and new behavioral dynamics. 
3.3 Elements of project negotiations 
Although each project is essentially unique, project negotiations have 
certain common, basic characteristics as well. For this purpose it is useful 
to refer to the project management literature, where a standard claim is that 
each project should have certain basic objectives, which may, however, 
differ in their relative importance. The three basic objectives, which are 
said to exist in every project, are scope, time and cost. The first project 
objective, scope, is the sum of products, services and immaterial value-
adding outcomes produced in the project. The time objective can be 
understood as schedule requirements for the project deliverables. The cost 
objective refers to the resources needed to produce and reward the 
production of the project deliverable, usually measured in monetary terms. 
Together, these three elements constitute the essential content of project 
agreements (Figure 4). 
Scope Time Cost
Content of
project agreement
 
Figure 4 Basic content of project agreements 
From the perspective of negotiation, these three general elements are 
actually basic negotiable issues in projects. The scope, cost and time are 
decision variables on which the parties negotiate a level of resolution from 
a range of alternatives. Only after the parties have come to an agreement 
on the particular value of scope, time and cost, these elements become 
objectives, against which performance can be operationally measured. 
It should, however, be noted that these objectives are not synonymous with 
the underlying interests of the parties as discussed earlier. To maintain 
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clarity of definition, scope, cost and time are issues under negotiation and 
the fixing of an option for each of the three issues combines into an 
agreement, which is evaluated against the profound interests of the parties.  
By accepting the standard profit maximization hypothesis of firms, 
profound client interests are best understood from an investment 
perspective, which takes into account broad, long-term considerations. A 
project’s worth for a client is the cost of investment plus the total value the 
investment is able to generate during its life cycle, usually measured as the 
net present value of all related cash flows. However, in maximizing 
profits, a client needs to consider many additional aspects such as the 
balancing of a portfolio of multiple projects, or a problematic dependency 
on any particular suppliers. Actually, the basic interests of the focal 
parties, the client and the contractor are likely to be more varied than the 
basic issues under negotiation in projects. 
So far as contractors are primarily interested in maximizing profit, the 
main interest of a contractor tends to be a consideration of the project’s 
short-term value, which is basically its price minus the total costs of sales 
and delivery. However, contractors may have less obvious interests as 
well. For example, a contractor may be interested in exploiting certain 
projects for long-term product development, testing or piloting purposes.  
The typical case is one where the delivery of a customized solution to a 
particular customer initiates and finances a process, the outcome of which 
is a product, which can be delivered as a standard solution to other 
customers too. In other instances, a contractor may be more interested in 
securing a more stable long-term business, such as operation and 
maintenance works, by delivering a particular project facility. Finally, the 
reference and associated brand value of delivering a project to a certain 
customer may outweigh the short-term gains of high project margins. 
Project industries are, in fact, experiencing the emergence of composite 
measures of valuation that explicitly acknowledge multiple interests. 
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3.4 Phases of project negotiations 
Each project sales and delivery passes through a relatively similar process 
(Cova & Holstius 1993). Seen from the project selling firm’s point of 
view, there are six generic and sequential phases (Table 3). In project 
marketing literature, these phases are argued to constitute a project 
marketing cycle. This cycle is also said to be self-renewing (Holstius 1987, 
Cova & Holstius 1993): 
Table 3 Project phases from project marketing perspective 
Phase Description 
Search Scanning the environment to identify project opportunities and relevant industry developments. 
Preparation 
Undertaking a feasibility study; exerting influence on the 
buyer and other relevant parties in order to get 
information and obtain tender specifications favorable to 
the contractor; evaluating the competitive situation. 
Bidding 
Preparing the bidding documents after receiving the 
invitation to bid, making decision concerning price and 
the use of resources. 
Negotiation Starts when the seller makes the preliminary offer for the project; ends the signing of a contract. 
Implementation 
Delivering and supervising the project; identifying and 
resolving of any problems, which may arise; training 
buyer’s personnel; possibly creating after-sales systems. 
Transition 
Evaluating the project as a whole; building up knowledge 
for future offerings; possibly supplying additional 
services to the buyer.  
 
The project phase model in table 3 can be extended to include the client 
perspective as well. Each project can, in fact, be conceived as two parallel 
projects: from the client’s perspective as a procurement and investment 
project; and from the contractor’s perspective as a sales and delivery 
project. Figure 5 extends the project phase model of table 3 by showing 
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simultaneous phase activities in both client’s and contractor’s organization, 
and interaction between the activities with important joint activities. At 
different phases, each party faces the problem of selection and 
commitment to a certain course of action. For example, in the preparation 
phase a contractor needs to select preferred projects to which the 
contractor commits through an internal agreement or an external 
registration for bidding. The arrows represent key inputs from preceding 
decisions to each following decision problem. An important issue to 
recognize is that with the proceeding of time the parties’ “degrees of 
freedom” decrease. By following a certain courses of action, the parties 
also narrow down their ability to influence the final result at later stages. 
For example, once a bid has been submitted, its terms are legally binding 
for the contractor.  
Search Preparation Bidding Negotiation Implementation Transition
Client
Segment
targeting Bidding decision
Call for tenders /
negotiations
Selection
of preferred
tender(s)
Submission
of tender
Investment
decision
Contract
award
Contract
modifications
Contract
closing
Contractor  
Figure 5 Main decisions of the client and the contractor in project phases 
In the first three stages (the search, preparation and bidding phases) the 
decisions taken by the counterparts are to a major extent individual, and 
represent one-sided commitment. For example, the contractor can 
individually and freely determine, whether he submits a bid, and if so, the 
document is one-sided. Whereas from stage four (negotiation), the 
decisions the counterparts take are essentially joint decisions with two-
sided commitments. The signing of the final contract requires both sides’ 
approval, and subsequent modifications to the contract require the 
approval of both parties. The negotiation and decision-making content of 
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each phase of the project (Figure 5) and the interaction between the client 
and the contractor is discussed in the following. 
In the first phase, the client ideally first selects the most productive uses 
for the company’s resources. Thus, the first decision is selection of a 
particular project that implies a superior return on investment compared to 
alternative uses. The next task is to select the procurement method, 
including the object of procurement and the set of counterparts to be 
involved in later stages. The outcome of this stage is the call for tenders or 
negotiations. The third task on the client side is to select the tender or 
tenders with which to continue detailed negotiations, resulting in the 
announcement of a winner or preferred bidders.  
From the contractor’s perspective, the first task, preceding any particular 
project opportunity is to select the segments or, in some instances, the 
customers which to target. The result is a more or less explicit sales plan. 
In the second phase, the contractor being aware of project opportunities 
selects the preferred projects. The third task is to select the economic, 
technological and legal terms of the tender and commit to them by 
submitting the documents to the client.  
An interesting further observation of the project phases illustrated in Table 
3 and Figure 5 is that the representation is conceptually highly similar to 
the phase model of negotiation and decision-making in general (Figure 2). 
This allows us to actually integrate the whole project sales and delivery 
process with the contents of the negotiation process (Table 4). This also 
allows the subsequent use of the logic and concepts of negotiation analysis 
for developing a negotiation-oriented insight into the process of selling and 
delivering projects.  
The negotiation perspective serves well in integrating the client and 
contractor perspectives. A project is essentially a joint endeavor, where the 
parties seek higher payoffs through cooperation than they could through 
unilateral action. Moreover the conception of a continuous negotiation 
process conforms well to the experiences of contemporary project business 
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practitioners. Applying the definition of negotiation developed in Chapter 
2, a project can be conceived as a process of joint decision-making where 
two or more parties communicate to select and commit to a common 
course of action that is superior to unilateral alternatives. 
The search and preparation phases essentially refer to the intelligence, or 
pre-negotiations phase (Table 4)), where the need to negotiate is 
recognized (scanning the environment to identify project opportunities and 
relevant industry developments); parties are identified; intelligence on the 
interests and BATNAs of both own and the other parties are gathered 
(evaluating the competitive situation); and the general issues under 
negotiation are defined (exerting influence in order to obtain tender 
specifications favorable to the contractor).  
The bidding and negotiation phases refer to the design, or around the table 
phase (Table 4), where the parties define their own interests; determine a 
set of options, for each issue (preparing the bidding documents); and 
evaluate the different combinations of options (contracts) with respect to 
their interests (making decisions concerning price and the use of 
resources).  
The implementation and transition phases refer to the choice, or packaging 
the agreement phase (Table 4), where the parties jointly select (preliminary 
offer for the project) and commit to a common negotiation contract 
(signing of a contract); and finally implement and control the 
implementation of the contract (delivering and supervising the project).  
The major difference in the phase models compared in Table 4 is that the 
project phase positions signing of a contract to the end of the negotiation 
phase, whereas the negotiation model positions the signing of the contract 
in the beginning of the next phase, i.e., in the beginning of the 
implementation of the project. Nevertheless, the focus in this study is on 
negotiations related to a single project. The first search phase and last 
transition phase in the project phase model actually refer to the period 
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between projects, and therefore the phases relating to a single project are 
defined by the project phases from preparation to implementation. 
Although the main idea in this study is that a project can be conceived as a 
negotiation process, it is important to acknowledge that meaningful 
negotiations are conducted thoughout the whole project lifecycle, i.e. the 
same pattern takes place at lower levels in all phases of a project. This 
perspective to negotiations in the project lifecycle emphasizes the role of 
negotiations as specific micro-processes – or tools – that can be applied 
locally for specific subjects in various phases of the project. Chapter 4 
emphasizes this perspective, while it introduces examples of phase-specific 
strategies that the client and the contractor could adopt in each phase of a 
single project.    
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Table 4 Conceptual comparison of the phase model of negotiation with the 
phases of selling and delivering a project 
Phase of 
negotiation Negotiation content Project phase and its content 
Search phase: scanning the 
environment to identify project 
opportunities and relevant industry 
developments. 
Intelligence 
or 
Pre-negotiations 
The need to negotiate 
is recognized; parties 
are identified; 
intelligence on the 
interests and BATNAs 
of both own and the 
other parties are 
gathered; and the 
general issues under 
negotiation are 
defined. 
Preparation phase: undertaking a 
feasibility study; exerting influence 
on the buyer and other relevant 
parties in order to get information 
and obtain tender specifications 
favorable to the contractor; 
evaluating the competitive situation.
Bidding phase: preparing the 
bidding documents after receiving 
the invitation to bid, making 
decision concerning price and the 
use of resources. 
Design 
or 
Around the table 
negotiations 
The parties define their 
own interests; 
determine a set of 
options, for each issue; 
and evaluate the 
different combinations 
of options (contracts) 
with respect to their 
interests. 
Negotiation phase: starts when the 
seller makes the preliminary offer 
for the project; ends at the signing of 
a contract. 
Implementation phase: delivering 
and supervising the project; 
identifying and resolving of any 
problems, which may arise; training 
buyer’s personnel; possibly creating 
after-sales systems. 
Choice 
or 
Packaging the 
agreement 
The parties jointly 
select and commit to a 
common negotiation 
contract; and finally 
implement and control 
the implementation of 
the contract. 
Transition phase: evaluating the 
project as a whole; building up 
knowledge for future offerings; 
possibly supplying additional 
services to the buyer 
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3.5 Summary of project negotiations 
The project marketing approach focuses on project business broadly as 
interaction between clients and contractors, emphasizing the concept of a 
business transaction between these two. This approach is worthwhile for 
the perspective adopted in this study. Thus, in this study we do not make a 
distinction between the project marketing process and the project sales and 
delivery process. 
Discontinuity, uniqueness and complexity were introduced as distinctive 
characteristics for selling and delivering projects. The nature of each of 
these three characteristics and their implications to project negotiations 
were introduced. An analysis of the characteristics of project business 
through the three characteristics of discontinuity, uniqueness and 
complexity revealed the relevance and complexity of negotiations in the 
context: projects make it difficult to rely on automated, impersonal market 
mechanisms to determine the terms of transactions; in the absence of 
routine terms, the ability to influence outcomes in any particular project 
through negotiations increases significantly; projects force the parties to 
balance short-term payoffs with potential gains resulting from future 
negotiations; projects typically involve recurring negotiation throughout 
the delivery process; project negotiations typically involve hundreds of 
issues and numerous spoken and unspoken interests; and finally, project 
negotiations are often multilateral, involving various independent interest 
groups or parties. 
Seen from the project selling firm’s point of view, there are six generic and 
sequential phases: search, preparation, bidding, negotiation, 
implementation, and transition. The first search phase and last transition 
phase in the project phase model actually refer to the period between 
specific single projects, and therefore the phases relating to a single project 
are defined by the project phases from preparation to implementation. We 
extended this project phase model of a contractor to recognize a view 
towards parallel phases of a client project. Each project can, in fact, be 
conceived as two parallel projects: from the client’s perspective as a 
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procurement and investment project; and from the contractor’s perspective 
as a sales and delivery project. We integrated these two parallel client and 
contractor project views by understanding the integrating negotiation 
activities between the client and the contractor. 
At different phases, each party faces the problem of selection and 
commitment to a certain course of action. During the progress of the 
project, the parties’ “degrees of freedom” decrease. In the first project 
phases the decisions taken by the counterparts are to a major extent 
individual, and represent one-sided commitment. In the latter phases of the 
project the decisions the counterparts take are essentially joint decisions 
with two-sided commitments. 
We provided a conceptual interpretation of integrating the project phases 
with the sequential phases of the negotiation process. We illustrated that 
the contents of project phases are analogous to contents of the general 
phase model of a negotiation. This interpretation emphasizes the fact that 
we could see the whole project progressing in time as analogous to a 
significant negotiation, where the major subject under negotiation is 
detailed in sequential project phases. This allows the subsequent use of the 
logic and concepts of negotiation analysis for developing negotiation-
oriented insight into the process of selling and delivering projects. We also 
complemented this view with another worthwhile interpretation, 
meaningful lesser negotiations are conducted thoughout the whole project 
lifecycle, much like a project can be divided into sub-projects. This second 
perspective to negotiations in the project lifecycle emphasizes the role of 
negotiations as specific whole micro-processes – or tools – that can be 
applied locally for specific subjects in various phases of the project.  
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4 Project negotiation strategies 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates application of the negotiation analysis approach to 
the four phases of a project, which are specific to any single project. These 
four project specific phases are preparation, bidding, negotiation, and 
implementation. The first search phase and last transition phase in the 
project phase model (Table 3) are excluded as general and non-project 
specific periods between projects. The framework is used to describe and 
analyze selected negotiation strategies that the primary project 
counterparts, the client and the main contractor, may employ with respect 
to the four phases.  
It is important to note that the presentation in this chapter is only meant to 
give a qualitative example of possible strategies. Therefore the 
presentation is best characterized as impressionistic, and a more 
analytically inclined audience may find it too general. Yet, a more precise, 
quantitative analysis of the strategies is also possible and encouraged. 
Furthermore, the strategies presented are samples, and other strategies 
could be derived by further empirical research in specific companies and 
organizations. Such empirical research could reveal other effective 
strategies that might be specifically worthwhile for certain business 
relationships and situations. 
In the preparation phase, the project opportunity has been detected, but the 
decision to bid or negotiate has not been taken. In the bidding phase, the 
decision to bid has been taken, but the client has not yet chosen the 
preferred bidder(s). In the negotiation phase, the preferred bidder(s) have 
been chosen, but the contract has not yet been awarded. In the 
implementation phase, the contract has been awarded, but the project has 
not yet been completed. 
A single negotiation strategy for the client and the contractor, for each of 
the phases will be covered. The negotiation strategies, which a client may 
want to employ in the four phases, are termed: market creation, reverse 
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auction, bargaining rounds and variation orders, respectively. The 
negotiation strategies, which a contractor may employ are: project framing, 
captive pricing, post-settlement modifications and acceptance test, 
respectively. These sample strategies are illustrated in Table 5 and the 
strategies will be elaborated in the following sections. 
Table 5 Phases specific to a single project, and examples of negotiation 
strategies available to the client and contractor in each phase, respectively 
 
4.2 Preparation phase 
4.2.1 Client: Market creation 
The discontinuity, uniqueness and complexity of a project make it difficult 
for a client to simply turn to the market for acquiring a total solution. In 
fact, each project may be characterized as an isolated market for goods and 
services (Cova & Hoskins 1997). A client often has considerable difficulty 
in specifying the objectives of a project, let alone, in determining the 
optimal means for accomplishing those objectives.  
Phase Description Client 
strategy 
Contractor 
strategy 
Preparation 
Project opportunity 
detected; decision to bid not 
yet taken 
Market 
creation 
Project 
Framing 
Bidding 
Decision to bid taken; 
preferred bidder not yet 
chosen 
Competitive 
sealed bid 
Captive 
pricing 
Negotiation Preferred bidder(s) chosen; contract not yet awarded 
Bargaining 
rounds  
Post-
settlement 
modifications 
Implementation Contract awarded; project not yet completed 
Variation 
orders 
Acceptance 
test 
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The client may therefore want to arouse interest in the project by publicly 
announcing a project opportunity. In fact, recently more sophisticated 
clients have started to go the market to satisfy a stated business need, and 
not fixed project objectives. By simply turning to a single, arbitrary 
contractor, the client might end up in a poor negotiation position. For 
example, a single contractor may not be in the optimal position to supply 
the required solution, or the contractor may take advantage of superior cost 
information to claim a greater share of the potential payoffs. 
It is therefore in the interest of the client to create a market, or more 
specifically, supply for the particular project. With reference to the 
negotiation analytic framework, this translates into essentially two 
concepts: a better BATNA and more integrative potential. 
First, a client must, of course, consider alternative ways of using their 
resources. As a bottom reference to return on resources can be considered 
the risk-free investment in government bonds. This is, of course, an 
ultimate reference, but useful in realizing that there are always alternatives 
available. Basically, each organization, depending on its risk management 
capability has its own minimum acceptable rate of return that represents a 
weighted average annualized rate of return it is able to generate on its 
investment portfolios.   
A project’s worth for a customer is therefore very basically the cost of 
investment plus the total value the investment is able to generate, usually 
measured as the net present value of future cash flows.  Whereas, a 
project’s worth to the contractor is basically its price minus the total costs 
of sales and delivery.  
By ensuring the participation of multiple contractors, the client develops a 
new BATNA with reference to negotiations with any single contractor. 
Competing solutions with associated price quotes improve the minimum a 
client can expect from later negotiations with any particular supplier. This 
is illustrated as BATNA’ in Figure 6. 
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Second, contractors differ in their capabilities. It may very well be that 
some contractors are better suited for a particular task, which translates to 
more integrative potential. An increased integrative potential may come 
from, for example, shared interests, economies of scale and, most 
importantly, from differences in preferences. This translates to a shift in 
the ZOPA to the northeast direction, as illustrated in Figure 6.  
Payoffs to
Contractor
Payoffs to
Client Contractor’s
BATNA
Client’s
BATNA
Efficient
frontier
ZOPA
Client’s
BATNA’
E’
ZOPA’
E
 
Figure 6 Market creation 
Assuming that the client and a contractor would eventually converge on a 
negotiated agreement, which is close to efficient and equitable, the 
combined effect of these two factors shifts the region of expected 
convergence from E to E’ (Figure 6). Generally speaking, the game 
becomes more favorable to the client. 
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4.2.2 Contractor: Project framing 
Project based firms have developed marketing practices designed to 
position them in a demand environment and enable them to react to project 
opportunities using a deterministic approach, or a constructivist approach 
(Cova & Hoskins 1997). It is important to realize that the project 
procurement process is very much constrained by statutory processes, 
applicable laws and regulations (such as percentage procured from local 
sources) and other institutional and policy barriers. Nevertheless, in the 
constructivist approach, the contractor becomes actively involved in 
shaping the competitive arena and the rules of the game (Cova, Mazet & 
Salle 1994).  
The success of this strategy is, of course, influenced by the extent to which 
the client is prepared to accept an interactive dialogue with the contractor. 
However, even on public sector tenders, where the client usually has a 
legal obligation to reject any interaction with the contractor in the name of 
fair play, the contractor can try to influence the project conditions by 
establishing contact with a variety of external experts, who will usually be 
called upon to assist the client in developing tender documents (Cova & 
Hoskins 1997).  
Basically in all tendering situations, the contractor’s aim is to distinguish 
its offer from those of its competitors and thereby achieve recognition by 
the customer as being the most suitable business partner (Cova & Hoskins 
1997). Applying the concepts of the negotiation analytic framework, this 
simply translates to worsening the client’s BATNA. 
A contractor can seek to influence the client’s interests, the criteria with 
which the client evaluates possible proposals in such a way, that the 
contractor appears more favorable in relation to competing contractors. 
This means that as external alternatives to a negotiated agreement with the 
contractor, the client does not expect to attain a very high payoff from the 
other contractors.  For example, a contractor might minimize overall 
perceived uncertainty associated with the contractors offering, and 
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maximize perceived uncertainty associated with a competitor (Cova & 
Hoskins 1997).  
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Figure 7 Project framing 
The consequence from the contractor’s point of view is that the client’s 
BATNA shifts to a lower level, which increases the potential to the 
contractor; and, again assuming that the parties would converge on a 
negotiated agreement, which is close to efficient and equitable, the 
combined effect of these two factors shifts the region of expected 
convergence from E to E’ (Figure 7). Generally speaking, the game 
becomes more favorable to the contractor. 
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4.3 Bidding phase 
4.3.1 Client: Competitive sealed bid 
Face-to-face individual negotiations between a client and contractor can be 
transformed into auctions by including other contractors in the game 
(Raiffa et al. 2002). Auctions are a special class of distributive negotiations 
involving three or more competing parties – the client and two or more 
competing contractors. In addition to the competitive client-contractor 
relationship, there is a competitive tension between the contractors.  
The reason why a client might want to use an auction mechanism instead 
of individual negotiations is simple: the competitive element between 
potential contractors may lead them to ignore the distribution of payoffs 
with the client. In a pure negotiation situation, a contractor is concerned 
with claiming a maximum share of available payoffs; in auctions, the 
contractor is also concerned with accessing the payoffs in the first place.   
There are different auction mechanisms that the client can employ, for 
example the Dutch auction, the competitive sealed bid, the Vickrey auction 
or the reciprocal bid (Raiffa et al. 2002). By far the most used is the 
competitive sealed bid, where each of several bidders submits a sealed-bid 
value for a given project. As an example, the government might auction 
off the rights to build and operate a given road system, and the bidders 
might be various construction companies or syndicates of companies who 
are bidding for the concession to manage the roads. Each syndicate 
submits a sealed bid; the bids are opened up simultaneously, and the 
contract is awarded to the highest bidder.  
In some situations it is the minimum value of the bid that will win the 
project. In a typical example, a government awards the contract for 
building a certain facility, such as a highway. Various contracting firms 
seek the project, and each submits a competitive sealed bid. The bid with 
the lowest cost to the government wins the contract.  
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Assuming a competitive sealed bid auction, where the bids of contractors 
are identical except for a single issue, the price, the ZOPA collapses into a 
diagonal frontier. If the client were to engage in price negotiations with a 
single contractor, convergence in an (equitable) agreement would be found 
in the region denoted N (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8 Competitive sealed bid 
By creating a competitive auction among the potential contractor’s, who 
must balance the payoffs implied by their bid, and the probability of 
winning, the client shifts the region of expected convergence closer to the 
contractor’s BATNA, and claims a greater share of the distributive 
potential to himself. 
Contractors need to consider essentially two things in their decision to bid: 
the payoffs implied by their bid, and the probability of winning with the 
bid.  Typically, the contractors seek to maximize their expected payoff, 
that is, the product of payoff and the probability of winning. In minimum 
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bid auctions, a low bid is associated with lower payoffs, i.e. a bad contract, 
but a higher probability of winning. A high bid implies high payoffs, but 
risks loosing the contract. 
A contractor would additionally benefit from decomposing the bidding 
problem into two components: analysis of own BATNA, to determine a 
threshold value for the bid, and analysis of the competing contractors’ 
BATNAs, to determine the Minimum Bid Of Others (MBOO) (Raiffa et 
al. 2002). At stage one a contractor submits a bid, at stage two a contractor 
learns if he wins or loses, that is, whether the bid was below or above 
MBOO. If the contractor wins, his surplus is the bid minus the BATNA. If 
the contractor loses, his surplus is zero.  
4.3.2 Contractor: Captive pricing 
As stated earlier, it is possible to distinguish between two broad options of 
marketing practices: the deterministic and the constructivist (Cova & 
Hoskins 1997). The deterministic approach is based on the principle that 
the project will be defined entirely by the future client, together with any 
advisors, and a contractor only anticipates the competitive arena.   
The decisive issue for winning projects that are completely specified is 
price. In poor economic circumstances or in intensely competed project 
business, a contractor might consider using a strategy, which can be 
termed as captive pricing.  
In following a strategy of captive pricing, the contractor is basically 
placing itself in the worst of all competitive positions by accepting the 
need to submit the lowest bid against a set of specifications and conditions 
of a contract (ibid.). However, captive pricing can also be understood in 
terms of strategic behavior, where the contractor submits an individually 
irrational bid at the tendering stage, in order to gain and earn on a 
monopoly position at later stages. 
For example, the contractor may seek to renegotiate technical and 
commercial terms during implementation of the contract in an effort to 
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improve the payoffs on the project. Or the contractor may, sometimes with 
guile, seek inconsistencies in design documents, incomplete specifications 
resulting in reorders, or launch any other claims in order to increase the 
payoffs of the project. 
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Figure 9 Captive pricing 
With reference to the negotiation analytic framework, this means that the 
contractor initially accepts a contract below its BATNA, and in subsequent 
stages engages in opportunistic claiming to earn a final surplus (Figure 9). 
4.4 Negotiation phase 
4.4.1Client: Bargaining rounds 
The negotiation phase in competitive bidding refers to working out minor 
details of the contract with a preferred bidder. However, in some public 
procurement procedures, as in the negotiated procedure developed for the 
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legal requirements of the European Union, there is a stage where the client 
has narrowed down the set of potential contractors to two or three. This 
stage is preceded by a bidding stage in which two or three preferred 
bidders are chosen for additional negotiations; and the stage ends in best 
and final offers (BAFOs) from the preferred bidders. 
More generally, as in negotiations between private counterparts, the client 
may, after identifying a set of promising bids engage in what can be 
termed as bargaining rounds. What this means is that the client, after 
receiving a quote from one contractor, goes to another contractor to ask for 
a slight improvement in terms, and repeats the procedure until the 
contractors converge on their best and final offers (Figure 10). This is a 
strategy, closely related to the concept of descending, or Dutch auction 
(see e.g. Raiffa et al. 2002). The client, again, exploits the competitive 
tension between the contractors to squeeze out some additional payoffs for 
himself at the cost of the contractor. 
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Figure 10 Bargaining rounds 
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4.4.2 Contractor: Post-settlement modifications 
Often a contractor has to submit a bid against a tight set of specifications 
and conditions, specified in the invitation to tender documents. In these 
situations a contractor is usually not able to utilize the full potential of its 
resources. Typically, a contractor is able to contribute to the final solution 
by making recommendations on the design, materials or process of 
implementation. Yet, this may not be possible in the bidding stage. 
Moreover, as Raiffa (1985) points out, negotiating parties might not 
choose to disclose their full confidential information (on interests, options, 
etc.) until after they have come to an agreement. Only after a tentative 
agreement might negotiators be willing to confide information and search 
for joint gains, i.e. better agreements. Sometimes the signing of a contract 
can open up the negotiations for more intense trading, creating and 
claiming behavior.  
The contractor might introduce new evidence or arguments to encourage a 
customer to re-evaluate the suitability of a chosen contract and thereby 
attempt to influence the revision of technical, commercial, or relationship 
issues within the documents (Cova & Hoskins 1997). The contractor can 
also introduce innovations unidentified by the client, and different from 
tendering documents. For example, the contractor can suggest a more 
enduring, less costly material, whereby both parties gain. The success of 
this strategy is again influenced by the extent to which the client is 
prepared to accept an interactive dialogue with the contractor. Where a 
customer refuses to enter into such dialogue, compliance with the 
conditions of contract becomes a prerequisite. 
The inclusion of new interests or the introduction of new issues or options 
within issues can have the effect of changing the ZOPA. In particular, 
where the parties identify shared interests or are able to make trade-offs on 
issues, where their preferences differ, integrative alternatives are formed. 
This is visualized in Figure 11, where the parties go through three rounds 
of renegotiations and make post-settlement modifications to the contract. 
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In this case, both parties’ payoffs are improved, although the contractor 
gains more from the modification.  
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Figure 11 Post-settlement modifications 
As noted earlier, research suggests that, essentially, information exchange 
promotes the development of good integrative solutions (Pruitt 1981, 
Thompson 1991, Kemp & Smith 1994, Raiffa et al. 2002). Legally 
speaking, the client often has the responsibility to disclose all relevant 
information prior to the bid preparation, otherwise the submitted bids can 
be void and the contractors can pull out of any agreements without penalty.  
So withholding information can disqualify the process itself and the use of 
this particular strategy. 
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4.5 Implementation phase 
4.5.1 Client: Variation orders 
Major projects often take years to complete and a client’s needs may 
change in the course of implementation. For example, in the construction 
industry variation orders are frequent, due to unapt designs or changes in 
needs. The client may try to take advantage of the bilateral monopoly 
situation with the contractor.  
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Figure 12 Variation orders 
It is not uncommon for the terms of contract to dictate that variation orders 
need to be completed on a cost-reimburse basis. This means that a client 
can seek to make change requests, which increase its payoffs, but where 
the contractor’s costs are only covered (Figure 12). This is essentially 
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claiming behavior, where the client gains and the contractor’s surplus stays 
constant (costs are compensated for).    
4.5.2 Contractor: Acceptance test 
In the implementation phase, a strategy contractors commonly use is an 
acceptance test. The essence of an acceptance test is to set a new BATNA 
for the contractor. The contractor has undertaken some work as determined 
in the project contract, and by receiving recognition from the client for 
fulfilling them; the contractor secures a certain level of payoffs for 
himself. This might be a strategic move, since the contractor may have 
better information as to what still needs to be done for the client to realize 
its payoffs from the project. When additional work is required, the 
contractor generally prices it high. 
Further negotiations can result in at least one of three possibilities (Figure 
13). First, the parties develop changes to the accepted facility, which 
increase the project’s worth to the client above that which the client 
expects on the basis of the project contract, and for which the contractor is 
compensated well (A). Second, additional work is required for the client to 
achieve the expected payoffs from the project, and the contractor is able to 
attain additional payoffs (B). Third, the additional work costs more for the 
client and it increases the value of the investment (C). 
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Figure 13 Site acceptance test 
4.6 Summary of project negotiation strategies 
The previous section described a set of maneuvers that either the client or 
contractor can use to transform the negotiation game into a more favorable 
game to themselves. A single negotiation strategy for each, the client and 
the contractor, for each of the project phases was covered. In this section 
the strategies are summarized with a short description of each strategy and 
its interpretation. 
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The negotiation strategies, which a client may want to employ, are market 
creation, reverse auction, bargaining rounds and variation orders (Table 6).  
Table 6 Summary of maneuvers available to client 
Strategy Description Interpretation 
Market creation 
Client arouses 
interest in the project 
by publicly 
announcing a project 
opportunity 
By ensuring the participation of 
multiple contractors, the client 
develops an attractive BATNA with 
reference to negotiations with any 
single contractor and maximizes 
integrative potential 
Competitive sealed 
bid 
Client arranges a call 
for tenders where 
two or more 
contractors are 
invited to submit 
tenders for the 
project 
Client transforms face-to-face 
negotiations into auctions and 
claims a greater share of 
distributive potential by shifting the 
region of expected convergence 
closer to contractor’s BATNA, who 
must balance payoffs of implied by 
bid with probability of winning 
Bargaining rounds 
Client, after 
receiving a quote 
from one contractor 
goes on to another to 
ask for a slight 
improvement in 
terms until 
convergence on best 
and final offers is 
reached 
Client claims a greater share of the 
potential payoffs by shifting the 
region of expected convergence 
closer to contractor’s BATNA, 
again by sequentially exploiting the 
competitive tension between the 
contractors  
Variation orders 
Client makes change 
requests on project 
contract 
Client claims additional gains 
unilaterally by exploiting the 
bilateral monopoly situation, in 
which the contractor needs to 
complete variation orders on a cost-
reimburse basis 
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The negotiation strategies, which a contractor may employ, are project 
framing, captive pricing, post-settlement modifications and acceptance 
tests (Table 7).  
Table 7 Summary of maneuvers available to contractor 
Strategy Description Interpretation 
Project 
framing 
Contractor becomes actively 
involved in the shaping of the 
client’s interests or perceived 
alternatives so that the contractor 
appears more favorable in 
relation to competitors 
Client’s BATNA shifts to a 
lower level, increasing the 
potential of the contractor 
leading to higher expected 
payoffs 
Captive 
pricing 
Contractor seeks to win a contract 
by submitting an extremely low 
bid and to make profits in later 
stages through contract claims 
Contractor accepts an 
individually irrational 
contract initially, but enters 
the feasible region 
eventually and ends up with 
positive surplus by claiming 
with guile during the course 
of the project 
Post-
settlement 
modifications 
Contractor makes 
recommendations on project plan 
or implementation after 
submitting a bid against tight 
specifications 
Contractor changes the zone 
of possible agreement by 
introducing new options for 
negotiated issues, new 
issues altogether, or by 
influencing the interests of 
the client, and thereby gains 
additional payoffs 
Acceptance 
test 
Contractor receives approval 
from client for completing a 
certain  subsection of the contract
Contractor secures a new 
BATNA, and may 
anticipate further changes in 
contract whereby additional 
gains are realized 
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5 Results and conclusions 
5.2 Theoretical issues 
The main results of the study include a conceptualization of the project 
sales and delivery process as a negotiation problem, and a qualitative 
description of various potentially effective negotiation strategies that the 
client and the contractor may adopt. 
The study selected a project marketing approach, which emphasizes the 
role of the project as a business transaction between a client and a 
contractor. In this respect, the study does not make a distinction between 
the project marketing process and the project sales and delivery process. In 
the project marketing approach, discontinuity, uniqueness and complexity 
have been introduced as distinctive characteristics for selling and 
delivering projects. The nature of each of these three characteristics and 
their implications to project negotiations were analyzed.  
Seen from the project selling firm’s point of view, there are six generic and 
sequential phases: search, preparation, bidding, negotiation, 
implementation, and transition. We observed that the contents of the 
phases of a project are analogous to the negotiation phase model. This 
observation allows us to interpret the project sales and delivery process in 
terms of a negotiation process. A project can be conceived as a process of 
joint decision-making where two or more parties communicate to select 
and commit to a common course of action that is superior to unilateral 
alternatives, i.e. to achieve payoffs none of the parties could achieve alone. 
Negotiation analysis offers a logically consistent framework for studying 
project negotiations. In this study, the elements of the approach as outlined 
by Sebenius (1992) were complemented with a number of other concepts 
found relevant in literature, and divided into two classes: concepts which 
relate to the analytic structure of negotiations and concepts which relate to 
the flow of negotiations within that structure.  
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Moreover, the pattern in the flow of negotiations was described with a 
phase model of negotiations, grounded in a general three-stage sequential 
model of decision-making. This model is an idealization of joint decision-
making and in reality the stages are not strictly distinct, but overlap and 
feed back from one another. The model highlights the important idea that 
negotiations are incompletely determined games, where the elements of 
the negotiations are not fixed but conceived in time. The negotiation 
setting more often than not takes shape through the repeated interaction of 
the parties and can therefore be characterized as a learning process. The 
parties may start with a very vague idea of the benefit of joint behavior and 
through interaction the parties learn about each other’s (and even their 
own) preferences, issues, options, alternatives and incrementally construct 
the zone of possible agreement, ZOPA, and potentially converge on a 
contract. We also reviewed four distinctive negotiation behaviors: 
contending, problem solving, yielding, and avoidance. 
The study illustrates application of the negotiation analysis approach to the 
four phases of a project, which are specific to any single project. These 
four project specific phases are preparation, bidding, negotiation, and 
implementation. The framework was used to describe and analyze selected 
negotiation strategies that the client and the main contractor may employ 
with respect to the four phases. The contractor’s four example strategies – 
one for each phase – included: project framing, captive pricing, post-
settlement modifications, and acceptance test. Respectively, the client’s 
four example strategies included: market creation, competitive sealed bid, 
bargaining rounds, and variation orders. However, it is important to note 
that this presentation only provides the reader with an example of possible 
strategies. Other appropriate and empirically applicable strategies must be 
derived by further empirical research in specific companies and 
organizations. Such empirical research could reveal more effective 
strategies that would be specifically worthwhile for certain business 
relationships and situations. 
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The negotiation analysis framework appears suitable for producing a 
qualitative description of selected negotiation strategies that either a client 
or a contractor may employ in the course of a single project. However, 
many additional complicating features of negotiations could be 
incorporated to the analytical framework, for example uncertainty (risk 
sharing), time (impatience), cognitive biases (behavioral realities), 
elaborate auction and bidding mechanisms, facilitation, mediation and 
arbitration, incentives, coalitional issues, threats, warnings and ultimatums.  
Due to its generality, the negotiation analysis approach may serve to 
integrate insights from different disciplines. Yet there are obvious dangers 
in drawing from multiple, self-standing theories: evidence for nearly any 
claim can be found by identifying the right source and the synthesis of 
multiple independent theories may risk becoming a conceptual mess. On 
the other hand, negotiation analysis primarily seeks to deliver practical 
value, and therefore, in part, the appropriateness of drawing from multiple 
disciplines is ultimately evaluated by pragmatic benefit, not theoretical 
appeal.  
Negotiation analysis generally assumes intelligent, boundedly rational, 
self-interest seeking behavior by the other parties. These assumptions and 
the neglect of, for example, personal factors in negotiations reveal 
negotiation analysis has serious limits. In reality, behavior can be highly 
irrational or unpredictable. Emotions and perceptions play a major part in 
any negotiation, and a party may, for example, exert monetary punishment 
for psychological or social reasons. Personal attributes may deter or call 
forth open communication, and therefore explain why some individuals 
realize higher payoffs than their colleagues. Moreover the parties to a 
negotiation process are seldom equally capable of reasoning, identifying 
and defending their positions.  
The distinction between hard, substance elements and softer, relationship 
elements is recurring in negotiation literature, but it is difficult to find 
theoretical groundings that justify the intuitively appealing distinction. For 
a theoretical grounding it could be possible to refer to economics literature, 
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particularly the discourse on social reality as a context for economic 
action. The key message of this discourse projected on negotiations is that 
the micro-level actions of actual negotiators can be analysed on two levels: 
the socio-psychological and the economic-legal levels. Negotiators operate 
on both, whether they are conscious of it or not. Both processes are in 
effect in any real world negotiations, and an explicit distinction allows 
sophisticated negotiators, scholars and practitioners alike, to pay attention 
to either level as deemed necessary. This in reality, of course may confer 
tactical advantage over a less proficient counterpart.  
The distinction between the two dimensions in negotiations is interesting 
and could potentially be incorporated into the negotiation analysis 
approach. It could, for example, be practical to distinguish between 
interests and issues on basis of whether they belong to the socio-
psychological dimension or the economic-legal dimension (c.f. Fortgang et 
al. 2003, Ertel 1999).  
5.2 Practical implications 
The results of this study enable understanding of the essential elements of 
systematic and beneficial negotiation activities in project deliveries. This is 
important, as research shows that contrary to common belief, people, on 
average, are not very good at negotiating optimal deals. The approaches 
and processes used to manage project negotiations are still relatively 
undeveloped in most organizations, and negotiators generally rely on 
situational factors in explaining the success or failure of negotiations. 
People responsible for project negotiations may have little training on the 
subject; additionally training on project negotiations often focuses on 
softer behavioral issues. 
Although behavioral aspects of negotiation are important, we believe that 
more systematic analysis of the structure and flow of negotiations is 
necessary. Negotiation analysis provides a theoretically well-founded 
methodology for preparing and managing project negotiations. A careful 
examination of the issues under negotiation, the various options for 
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resolution and the parties’ underlying interests can lead the parties to win-
win behavior and to converge on win-win type outcomes, which ideally 
leave no money on the table, i.e. are efficient.  
The strategies introduced in this study can be used as examples of what the 
successful negotiation strategies might be and interactive training sessions 
in companies could be combined with empirical research with a purpose to 
contribute to the creation of new, more detailed and empirically applicable 
strategies. 
In principle, negotiation analysis approach could be used to quantify 
negotiation process to find the optimum outcome. As such it can be used 
as a training tool. However, for practical applications, we suggest that a 
qualitative application of negotiation analysis would be most fruitful in 
project negotiations. A qualitative application is mostly concerned with 
consciously directing attention to the critical aspects of a negotiation 
situation with the help of a complete and consistent framework. The best 
negotiation results are achieved when both parties trust each other and 
share information about their preferences.  Practical suggestions for 
managing negotiations from negotiation analysis perspective include: 
• An understanding of the alternatives for negotiations is essential not 
only for the simplistic reaching of an agreement, but for actively 
managing the attractiveness of the alternatives (e.g. customer can 
emphasize value of continuous business relationship resulting from 
this project). 
• The main integrative potential in negotiations comes from 
differences on how each party values the issues under negotiation. It 
is important to identify and analyze these differences to create win-
win contracts.  
• It is beneficial to seek for opportunities to change the negotiation 
structure (e.g. issues under negotiation and their options) during 
negotiations for a better outcome.   
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• All decisions made during the negotiations are based on subjective 
perceptions of negotiation parties. It is possible to influence how the 
other parties may value different outcomes.   
• Analysis is necessary to correct people’s intuitions, and the benefit 
of systematic preparation may be significant in attaining good 
negotiation outcomes. Moreover, although experience and intuition 
are highly important, it is difficult to codify and transfer them 
between negotiators. Analysis, on the other hand, can be codified 
and taught. 
The negotiation analysis approach creates awareness of the structure and 
flow of negotiations and ultimately helps change negotiation games more 
favorable to negotiators. The conscious directing of attention toward the 
structure and flow of negotiations is the route to intuitive application of the 
concepts and, ultimately, more favorable negotiation outcomes. The 
approach can also be applied in practical settings for the purposes of 
preparing for negotiations as well as training for the discipline. As a 
direction for further research, empirical experience of such uses is 
encouraged. 
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Glossary 
Alternative, an external solo choice that a party can pursue if the 
negotiations break down. 
Asymmetrically prescriptive-descriptive, an analysis orientation that 
seeks to develop prescriptive advice to one party, given a description of 
how others will behave. 
Behavioral decision theory, descriptive studies of how and why people 
think the way they do, usually with reference to the rationality ideal. 
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), best outside 
alternative a party can turn to, should the party fail to reach an agreement 
in the current negotiation. 
Boundedly rational behavior, choice behavior intended to be rational, 
in the sense of calculatedly maximizing personal utility, but is constrained 
by limited cognitive, temporal or computational capabilities. 
Contract, the fixing of an option for each of the issues combines into a 
contract, which determines an expected payoff to each party as measured 
by the degree the contract satisfies the interests of that party. 
Contract set, the set of all payoff combinations associated with the 
various possible agreements.  
Decision analysis, the systematic decomposition and clarification of an 
independent decision problem where the payoffs of decisions are not 
affected by the decisions of other involved parties anticipating one’s 
actions. 
Dominance, a contract is dominated if there is another contract which 
leaves none of the parties worse off and is preferred by at least one party.  
Efficiency, a contract is efficient if it is non-dominated. In other words, the 
payoffs to any single party cannot be unilaterally improved without 
worsening the payoffs to some other party. 
Efforts to change the game, purposive behavior designed to change the 
ZOPA, or at least to change the way in which other parties perceive it. 
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Fairness, a fair sharing refers to a contract that gives each party a similar 
proportion of their potential. There are two basic approaches to determine 
a fair outcome:  a fairness standard and a fair procedure. 
Feasibility, a contract is said to be feasible, or individually rational for 
each party if the contract assigns to each party a payoff that is at least as 
good as that party’s BATNA. 
Flow of negotiation, concepts, which refer to behavior within the structure 
of negotiation, the interaction of the structural elements in time and the 
linked processes of “creating” and “claiming” value; and efforts to 
“change the game” itself. 
Game theory, a framework for analyzing interdependent decision-making, 
where the parties make their decisions independently of each other, but 
these separate choices interact to determine a payoff for each side. 
Impact, actual payoffs of a contract. The payoffs at the time of the signing 
of the contract are expected payoffs, and are likely to be different from the 
actual payoffs resulting from implementing the jointly-selected course of 
action.  
Incompletely determined, the elements of the situation are not fixed and 
cannot be described objectively in full detail. 
Interests, the measures against which possible agreements are evaluated. 
Issues, the content of agreements. Each issue under negotiation is basically 
a decision variable with two or more possible resolutions. 
Negotiation, a process of joint decision-making where two or more parties 
communicate to select and commit to a common course of action.  
Options, the set of possible resolutions for each issue that might be jointly 
negotiated and jointly pursued. Options are basically the ranges of the 
decision variables. 
Party, a negotiation side, from which the analysis typically assumes 
intelligent, but boundedly rational, self-interest seeking behavior. 
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Plus-sum game. It is possible to increase the payoffs to one or more 
parties without decreasing the payoffs to other parties; also referred to as 
integrative negotiations. 
Potential, refers to the maximum surplus a party can receive, associated 
with a contract, where the other parties’ surpluses are zero.  
Principle of reciprocal inclusivity, negotiations should include all issues 
of relevance to all parties. 
Project, a complex transaction covering a package of products, services 
and work, specifically designed to create assets that produce benefits for a 
buyer over an extended period of time. 
Self-interest seeking, a party has goals of its own, which the party 
actively pursues. 
Structure of negotiation, comprises concepts that determine the analytical 
configuration of a negotiation outside of time.  
Subjective perspective, the analysis relies heavily on subjective sources 
of information. 
Surplus, to a party is the difference between the payoffs associated with a 
contract and the party’s BATNA.  
Value left on the table, an acknowledgement that the negotiating parties 
do not automatically reach efficient solutions. 
Zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), the set of feasible contracts.  
Zero-sum game, an increase in a party’s payoffs necessitates an equal 
decrease in another party’s payoffs, also referred to as distributive 
negotiations. 
Win-win agreement, any feasible contract beyond the parties BATNAs. 
Win-win behavior, joint improvement of a tentative agreement or 
negotiation text. 
